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The research provides facts showing Iran’s capabilities in processing nuclear 
weapons at a high degree. Nuclear capabilities provided Iran with uranium enrichments 
abilities and nuclear weapons to enable the country to impose control on Gulf states. 
The research also demonstrates the threats affecting Arabian Gulf states in the 
event of Iranian nuclear project completion at a high degree, including increased 
violence, the expansion of corruption and terrorism, local security threats, and the 
disturbance of economic security. 
Furthermore, the research discusses obstacles that Arabian Gulf states may face in 
the event of the completion of an Iranian nuclear project at a high degree: political 
dialogue required to force Iran to stop continuing its nuclear project, ability to convince 
Iran, and a clear strategy to protect the Arabian Gulf region. 
Lastly, the research considers the strategic vision and equivalent methods required 
in the face of an Iranian nuclear project, which include the possibility that other Arabian 
Gulf states also possess nuclear weapons, international assurances that Iran’s nuclear 
project is to be used only for peaceful applications, and a stable political negotiation 
among the Arabian Gulf states and Iran. 
The main recommendation of the research introduces the establishment of a 
unified nuclear power authority under the supervision of the Gulf Cooperation Council on 
using nuclear projects peacefully. Another recommendation is to conduct an international 
summit to seize weapons of mass destruction in the Arabian Gulf region in particular, and 
the Middle East in general. A final recommendation is for international and regional 
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The Gulf Cooperation Council states, like the rest of the world, would benefit from a 
negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, or at least a continuation of the current 
uneasy standoff. However, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities or an Iranian push to 
produce nuclear weapons would pose excruciating risks and dilemmas for the two most 
economically and politically significant Gulf states  
–George Perkovich1 
 
According to George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Iran constitutes perhaps the greatest threat to the 
stability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. As noted by Perkovich, the most 
important requirement in the Gulf states is to maintain national security. The Iranian 
threat is the same for all Gulf states, suggesting that it is essential for GCC states, as a 
unified whole, to confront the Iranian nuclear program (INP). Based on this objective, 
this thesis first seeks to focus on peaceful political, economic, and strategic pressures that 
the Gulf states can bring to bear on Iran to halt its nuclear program. Second, this thesis 
emphasizes the establishment of the Gulf nuclear program to restore the strategic balance 
in the region and to protect GCC states, forestall Iran’s ambitions, and discourage 
expansionist interests to control the region. 
Jameel Althyabi notes that Gulf states’ fears of an Iranian program increased 
when Iran and the United Nations (UN) Security Council reached a deal on November 
24, 2013, regarding the continuing INP.2 Although the UN Security Council claimed that 
the INP is for peaceful purposes, it remains very difficult to predict its outcomes or Iran’s 
compliance with the agreement. Due to the uncertainty of Iran’s intentions in its nuclear 
program, the Gulf states must exert pressure on Iran to maintain its stated peaceful 
intentions. 
                                                 
1 Perkovich George, Brian Radzinsky, and Tandler Jaclyn, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge and the 
GCC,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 31, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org.  
2 Jameel Althyabi, Iran and Crab dancing (Īrān wa-raqṣat al-saraṭān) (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 
Obeikan Bookstore, 2011), 102.  
 2 
It becomes clear to the Gulf states that the possession of nuclear weapons may 
very well encourage Iran to exercise hegemony and domination over its neighboring 
countries. As noted by one observer in the Gulf, ranian nuclear weapon danger was not 
unclear to the leaders of GCC States, and this is why they declared that their countries are 
working for preparing a joint study to build up a nuclear program for peaceful use during 
the Al-Jaber summit in Riyadh in 2007.3 
Giving voice to this perspective, Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman stress 
that Gulf states must have a strategy to protect the region from any threats, from either 
Iran or elsewhere; in addition, Gulf state governments have to look for the way to set up 
their collective and national assets.4 Toukan and Cordesman believe that the Gulf states 
have to be responsible for military protection and any direct confrontation, no matter the 
cost, with Iran or any other antagonist. This attitude justifies the Gulf states to join the 
GCC Joint Defense Treaty and enhance cooperation among them.5 
According to Tariq Khaitous study, all Arab regimes believe that the INP is a 
means of getting into the military’s nuclear weapons.6 Therefore, they must search for a 
political solution to a political solution to bypass the INP. Arab regimes know that Iran 
has taken a major step forward in stabilizing its regional power and hence will have more 
leverage to intervene in Arab issues. In general, the INP could have a major influence 
over Gulf states’ nonproliferation in the Middle East. Arab regimes are unhappy because 
Israel already has nuclear weapons, and the INP will make it so that each country try to 
own nuclear weapons. It is also possible that Arab regimes might stop their cooperation 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Abdullah Toukan and Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iranian Nuclear Challenge: GCC Security, Risk 
Assessment, and US Extended Deterrence (CSIS Report No. 110202) (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic International Studies, 2011), 32, http://csis.org/files/110202.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Tariq Khaitous, Arab Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Policy Focus #94) (Washington, DC: 
Washington Institute for Near East, 2009), 10–19, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/PolicyFocus94.pdf. 
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 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION A.
The major research question for this thesis is as follows: What is the Gulf’s 
strategic vision in the face of the Iranian nuclear project (INP)? From the main question 
of the study, the following sub-questions arise:  
1. What are the threats facing the Gulf states if the INP comes to 
completion?  
2. What are the obstacles that hinder the success of the Gulf states’ efforts to 
confront the Iranian nuclear program?  
3. What are the methods of facing the INP?  
 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION B.
This study analyzes and explains the risks and means of confronting the INP. The 
research also shows that neither hard power nor soft solutions alone can address Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions. A combination of hard and soft power with minimal external influence 
is required. Furthermore, making the citizens of the GCC states at all levels aware of the 
consequences of the problem and forming public opinion in the Gulf states regarding the 
risks of this threat, which is internationally condemned, will exert more pressure on Iran 
to cooperate. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW C.
The present study focuses on giving a strategic vision in the Gulf states to face the 
INP through three approaches: direct confrontation, promoted by the Gulf states to the 
public that objects to the completion of the INP; use of soft power in the form of 
economic boycotts against Iran; and an indirect confrontation through a Gulf nuclear 
project, for peaceful purposes, as a preventive deterrent in order to create strategic 
balance in the region.  
Trista Parsi identifies the intricate, highly cooperative interactions between Iran 
and other states during the reign of Shah Mohammed Rez Pahlavi.7 Parsi notes that the 
cooperation continued until the international community became disturbed after Iran 
                                                 
7 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New 
York: Yale University Press, 2007), 1–49. 
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insisted on completing its nuclear project on the pretext of using nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. The study has come up with many results, which include the 
following: 
(1) Gulf states countries should endeavor to inform the United States of the 
dangers of Iran, its expansion ambitions, the chaotic instability that it 
caused in the Arabian Gulf region and its continuous endeavor to cause 
disorders in Arab countries through provocation, and material and moral 
support of Shia.8  
(2) The nature of Israel-Iran relations changed from the implied alliance into 
the declared hostility, and Israel declared its desire to destroy Iranian 
nuclear capabilities to prevent it from creating a balance with Israel in the 
region.9  
(3) The United States should impose sanctions on Iran to prevent it from 
completing its nuclear program, and give two options, either to possess the 
nuclear weapon or to undermine the economy, which may be associated 
with a revolution against the regime or a loss of authority.10  
(4) The ideal option is to continue imposing sanctions on Iran so that it 
becomes an economically torn state in the event that it succeeds in the 




Tariq Khaitous argues that a nuclear-armed Iran would significantly impact the 
balance of power in the Middle East, causing Arab regimes to be concerned that Iran 
would become the most powerful country in the region.12 Khaitous further notes that the 
apprehensiveness could either lead to an arms race among Gulf states to mitigate the 





12 Khaitous, Arab Reactions, 12.  
 5 
threat, or increase extra-regional cooperation with organizations such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
13
 Additionally, Khaitous notes that Gulf states are 
uncomfortable with Israel’s nuclear capability, which seems to have worsened the 
situation.
14 Nonetheless, he concludes that an effective resolution is one that comes from 
the Arabs and not the West. Khaitous’ conclusions are in line with the proposed 
recommendations in this paper for the Gulf states in facing nuclear Iran.15 
Elizabeth Iskander contends that the Arab Spring and re-configurations in Arab 
countries have made relations and outcomes more uncertain.16 Iskander concludes that 
the causes of protest, collectively referred to as the Arab Spring, vary from one to 
another. Thus, each state should be considered a separate entity, and the crisis could lead 
to more cooperation among the states. Iskander, however, stresses that building relations 
under such conditions is weak and could undermine national, regional, and international 
cooperation.17 
Jameel Althyabi investigates Iran’s possession of nuclear technology, which 
enabled it to manufacture the nuclear weapons and change the balance of power in the 
Middle East.18 Althyabi found that Iranian policies are continuing to possess the nuclear 
capabilities at the expense of the increased ratio of unemployment and poverty, and the 
decreased standard of living for the Iranian people. His findings include the following: 
(1) From the perspective of the Gulf states governments, when Iran owns 
nuclear weapons, it provokes disorder in Gulf states through attempts to 
overthrow the ruling regimes in the Gulf countries.19  
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 23. 
15 Ibid. 23–24. 
16 Elizabeth Iskander, “Arab-Iranian Relations: Discourses of Conflict and Cooperation,” LSE 
International Relations, November 2011, 2–9, http://www.lse.ac.pdf. 
17 Ibid., 7. 
18 Althyabi, Iran and Crab Dancing, 17–69.  
19 Ibid. 
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(2) Iranian policy still works in accordance with the conspiracy idea through 
sustaining religious and doctrinal emotion within the Gulf states to render 
emotions towards a condition of sectarian expansion, which entraps the 
Arabian region to ultimately place it under the condition of bloody war 
(i.e., revolution).20 
(3) Iran endeavors to control Arab citizens and disseminate the Shia doctrine 
in a manner consistent with its agenda and interests in a manner 
inconsistent with the requirements of security and stability in the Gulf 
states region.21 
Ray Takeyh examines the role of Iran in the new Middle East, the turning points 
in the American-Iranian relationships, and the way of understanding Iran.22 Takeyh’s 
findings include the following:  
(1) The Gulf states are among Iran’s most important strategic priorities; 
therefore, Iran endeavors to dominate them and impose its authority 
among them.23  
(2) After the Islamic Revolution, Iran caused disorders and demonstrations in 
most of the Gulf states by making use of Shia groupings in demonstrating 
claim for economic and political rights.24  
(3) Iran endeavored to provoke the Gulf states into discontinuing their 
relations with United States, but the Gulf states refused to sacrifice their 
relations with United States for the sake of Iran and its avidity in the 
region.25  
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Henry Holt, 
1997), 11–58. 
23 Ibid., 14–18. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 26. 
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(4) Iran succeeded in remedying its relations with neighboring Arabian Gulf 
states (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain). 
A series of commercial, diplomatic, and security agreements have been 
signed between Iran the Arabian Gulf countries, which saved the Iranian 
economy.26  
(5) Despite the implied alliance between Israel and Iran, Israel totally rejected 
Iran’s endeavor to possess nuclear capabilities, and exerted considerable 
efforts to stop the INP by extending military strikes against Iranian nuclear 
facilities.27  
(6) Iran noted that its possession of Islamic nuclear weapons is for the 
achievement of the strategic balance with Israel.28  
(7) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia considered the Iranian nuclear bomb to be a 
Persian bomb and not an Islamic one. It does not form a threat to Israel 
alone, but it also forms a strategic threat to the Arabian Gulf countries, 
which Iran endeavors to dominate, control, and to interfere with in their 
internal affairs.29 
Claudia Balzán believes that the INP is the most serious problem threatening the 
security of the Gulf region.30 Balzán analyzed Iranian threats to the Gulf countries and its 
attempt to destabilize and overthrow the existing regimes and replace them with Shiite 
regimes. Balzán also notes the limitation of American options to prevent Iran’s 
possession of nuclear capabilities and the need to change tactics. Balzan findings include 
the following:  
(1) The most important reason behind the Gulf-Iranian conflict is the 
disagreement between their visions; the Gulf’s vision is peaceful, 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 33. 
29 Ibid., 35. 
30 Claudia Balzán, “Security Cooperation in the GCC: Challenges and Opportunities,” Florida 
International University, April 25, 2014, http://magg.fiu.edu.pdf 
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cooperative, and moderate, while the Iranian vision relies on aggression to 
dominate and expand when the chance is available.31  
(2) The Iranian strategic vision is based on three elements: the historical 
element, the geopolitical element, and the religious element. These are 
reflected by the Persian racism and the insistence on Iran’s responsibility 
for the security of the Gulf and the rule of the Islamic jurist, which Iran is 
subject to due to its absolute authority.32  
(3) The political aspect of facing the danger of the Iranian authority in the 
region starts from consolidating the Gulf efforts of internal reform. This 
goal is accomplished through gradual policies that expand public 
participation in taking decisions and solving the Shiite minority problem 
to prevent Iranian interventions. The Shiite minority issue can be solved 
by stressing the concept of citizenship as a basis for the state, which deals 
with its citizens without distinction for any reason.33 
(4) Iran endeavors to extend military protection to Iranian nuclear facilities in 
case the diplomatic efforts fail.34  
(5) The experts point out that, if Iran could run away from the control of the 
IAEA, if the efforts of the international diplomacy fail to contain Iranian 
rashness to manufacture the nuclear weapon, and if both the United States 
and Israel fail to destroy the Iranian nuclear programs, it is almost 
inevitable that Iran will possess nuclear weapons within three to five 
years.35    
 







Jeff Duncan opines that international leniency with Iran would be a bad choice.36 
Iran leads the terrorism and has directly enabled groups such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. 
Additionally, Iran continues its policy to own nuclear weapons and tries to change the 
balance of power in the region with respect to countries like Iraq and Syria. Iran has deep 
involvement in Latin America because its influence and networks may threaten the 
United States. Duncan notes that Iran cannot be trusted, and the United States 
Department of State concludes that Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere as 
waning is inconclusive. He supports this argument with the government accountability 
office report for Congress, which recommends the reassessment and update on Iran.37  
This literature review finds that a more lasting way of facing Iran’s nuclear threats 
should be created by the Gulf states and not by the West. It also reveals that uprisings, 
such as the Arab Spring, should not be used as means for speculating about how countries 
like Iran will relate to its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, the conflicting views of Iran’s 
behavior with the West should not determine the United States policy toward Iran. Thus, 
the United States needs to continue to support friendly Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan, and regional institutions to stop the threat of Iran. Finally, these findings will 
help determine the best way Gulf states face INP. 
 POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES D.
From my preliminary literature review, the proposal tests the following 
hypotheses: 
(1) The obstacles that limit the efforts of the Gulf states in confronting the 
Iranian nuclear project are the weaknesses of Gulf political dialogue in 
convincing Iran to stop completing its nuclear project, the inability of the 
Arabian Gulf countries to contain Iran, and the absence of a clearly 
defined Arabian Gulf strategy to secure the region.  
                                                 
36 Jeff Duncan, “An ‘Invisible’ Iran in the Western Hemisphere: America’s Strategic Blind Spot,” The 
Hill, October 21, 2014, http://thehill.com/opinion. 
37 Ibid. 
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(2) The strategic vision and equivalent methods to confront INP on advanced 
level are the Gulf states’ possession or production of nuclear weapons, the 
provision of international guarantees to the Gulf states that Iran shall not 
exploit its nuclear powers by peaceful purposes, and establishing political 
dialogue between Gulf states and Iran. 
 11 
II. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT, ITS FACTS, AND 
CONSEQUENCES ON THE GULF 
Israeli and American leaders are in full agreement on the need to prevent Iran 
from obtaining nuclear weapons. The question, therefore, is not if we should 
thwart Iran’s illicit nuclear ambitions, but rather how we can do so most 
effectively. 
–Robert Wexler38 
The Iranian nuclear project (INP) constitutes a serious threat to the security of the 
Gulf states, creating a strategic disequilibrium of power in the region that gives Iran a 
dominant position. Therefore, the Gulf states have the right to take all necessary action to 
counter such threats and to challenge all forthcoming dangers, whether through soft 
power or via political, strategic, and economic positions, to prevent the INP. The Gulf 
states should take the necessary measures to establish a Gulf nuclear project to act as a 
strong deterring factor to ensure their essential protection. This will restore strategic 
equilibrium between them and Iran.39 
After Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, Iraq’s main capabilities, as well as its 
military infrastructure, were destroyed. This led to a strategic disequilibrium within the 
Gulf states region. In addition, it turned the balance of power in favor of Iran. For this 
reason, Iran likely saw that possessing nuclear weapons was the best preventative action 
to avoid being attacked and occupied by the United States.40  
 SYNOPSIS ABOUT IRAN A.
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Iran is located in western 
Asia and consists of 1,648,000 square km.41 Its shares its northern border with 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea. Armenia, Turkey, and Iraq are to the 
                                                 
38 Robert Wexler, “Israel and Iran: An Attack Might Be Necessary, but Not Yet,” World Affairs 
Journal, May/June 2012, Accessed January 24, 2015, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article. 
39 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 59–60. 
40 Ibid., 96. 
41 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook: Iran (Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2015), https://www.cia.gov/library. 
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west; Afghanistan and Pakistan are to the east; and the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman are to the south. Iran has a southern coastline that extends over 1,660 km and a 
northern coastline that extends 800 km along the Caspian Sea. Its capital is Tehran, and 
its major cities are Mashhad, Isfahan, Tabreez, and Ahwaz. 
The geographic location of Iran is a critical factor for its economic security 
because it determines its ability to cope with economic development. The more 
strategically important the state’s location, resources, work force, and material 
possibilities, the more it is independent and rich without needing any sustenance of third 
parties. It is therefore capable of self-support. This gives Iran the benefit of its distinct, 
centrally located geographic position overlooking the Arabian Gulf and its control over 
the Strait of Hormuz sharing with Oman, one of the most important factors by which it 
has acquired its strategic power.42 
 IRANIAN ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES B.
According to Asmaa Badawi, professor of political science at Kafr el-Sheikh 
University, the most important economic capabilities in Iran include the following:43 
1. Natural Gas and Petroleum 
Both resources give Iran a strategic force in the Middle East, which makes it 
occupy second place worldwide in natural gas reserves, third place in petroleum reserves, 
and second in petroleum exports. Iran is a major force in the field of energy. In 2005, Iran 
spent $4 billion on fuel imports, with an average consumption rate of 4 million barrels of 
petroleum daily, compared to the peak of 6 million barrels daily in 1974.44 In 2004, a 
large percentage of Iranian natural gas reserves were unexploited. Iran is the third country 
worldwide to develop the technology to transform gas into liquids. Moreover, many new 
electrohydraulic stations were constructed to meet the expenses of operating the 
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traditional stations run by coal and petroleum. In 2004, Iran inaugurated the first station 
of wind energy, as well as a land thermal energy station.45 
2. Industry  
Badawi cites twenty-five years of industrial growth in Iran. She indicates that the 
number of industrial units in which workers exceed ten members is approximately 11,000 
units, of which 16 percent are in the sustenance industries, 15.7 percent is in the field of 
textiles, garments, and leather,46 and 17.1 percent are in the field of tools, machinery, and 
metal equipment. Over one million workers in Iran work in shops that employ fewer than 
ten employees. Furthermore, to encourage industrial investment during 1990–1995, the 
Iranian government established many industrial projects, which were able to provide 
more than 227,000 jobs.47 In addition, the state developed the original plans for heavy 
equipment production, producing 10 to 20 thousand units, and increasing output of the 
petrochemical industry in 1995. Wade cherub vehicle output increased during that same 
period to 74 thousand cars, and cement production increased to 16.9 million tons. 
According to International Organization of Automobile Manufacturers (OICA) claims 
vehicle production in Iran rose in 2009 by 9.4 percent, when it ranked fifth in the number 
of car producing countries.48   
3. Agriculture 
Badawi says that 25 percent of the population works in the agricultural sector. 
Iran has fertile lands and a diverse climate that ranges from mild to cold, enabling it to 
produce a variety of crops with the use of modern agricultural techniques that have 
increased production at a rapid rate, yielding a variety of a surplus of grains that is then 
exported.49 




48 International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), 2009 production statistics, 
http://www.oica.net  
49 Badawi, http://Asmaa Badawi 
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4. Production  
Iran has increased its commercial and trade relations to the global countries. The 
export of fruits, carpets, and luggage are noteworthy and characterized by quality and low 
prices compared to European and American prices. Iran was achieved self-sufficiency 
especially after the war with Iraq and the trade embargo. Iran has benefited from the ban 
by diversification of production.50 
5. Economic Problems 
Badawi indicates that, despite its economic growth, Iran still faces political 
problems, and the imposition of economic sanctions and the trade embargo have hindered 
the growth of the Iranian economy and resulted in the instability of the Iranian 
government, which in turn resulted in the rapid decline of Iran’s economy after President 
Najad’s reelection. Iran has seen a decline in investment, especially in the oil and gas 
industries, which has led to recession.51 The World Bank in 2010 ranked Iran 137 among 
187 countries. Their report warned that the situation is not attractive for investment. 
Employment and other economic conditions are leading towards an economic collapse. 
The report stated that the control of the Revolutionary Guard on Iran’s economy caused 
the economic crisis, increased unemployment, and caused the rise in the cost of living, 
which is a threat to the underprivileged. According to The Heritage Foundation, Iran 
ranks ninth from the bottom of 161 countries in economic freedom.52 
 IRANIAN POLITICAL WILL C.
Sayeed Othman argues that Iran continues to use the threat of military force to 
influence relations with the UAE.53 Iran refused to return the three United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) islands of Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Turnbs. The UAE tried to regain the 
islands, but Iran has threatened war if the UAE continues to pursue them. Iran has 




53 Sayed Othman, “Iranian Political Will: Selections Iranian,” Albainah, November 2002, 1–5, 
http://www.albainah.net/21. 
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insisted on continuing its nuclear program, claiming it is only for peaceful purposes. It is 
worse noting that Iranian political issues are centered on the Gulf states to “develop a 
common security strategy” in the region. Iran stressed that ending the U.S. military 
presence in the Gulf reduces the threat level. Iran’s policy is to consult with the Gulf 
states to develop new security arrangements, including a non-aggression pact and a 
mutual defense treaty.54 
Othman notes that, in contrast, since 1979 Iran has sought to strengthen the 
coordination of security measures with Kuwait to prevent drug smuggling. During this 
visit, they discussed the presence of troops and defense and security agreements, 
including land bases and facilities specifying those to be used for defending host 
countries, specifically regarding the U.S. military presence and other countries’ military 
presence in the Gulf. They agreed that military presence did not constitute an impediment 
to improving defense ties with countries in the region.55 In September 2000, they 
launched a direct air route between the Iranian city of Yazd and Kuwait, passing through 
the city of Ahvaz in the Khuzenstan Province. In October 2001, Kuwait and Iran agreed 
to form a joint security committee aimed at fighting drug trafficking, piracy, and 
terrorism. They agreed to discuss visits between the defense ministers of both countries.  
Othman argues that, as a way of enhancing cooperation, in May 1999, the 
minister of commerce and industry of Oman visited Tehran and signed an extension 
agreement to promote economic cooperation and stimulate trade between the two 
countries. Iran and Oman signed a trade agreement in May 2001 for the promotion and 
protection of investment and avoidance of double taxation.56 Their agreement also 
promoted cooperation in education, agriculture and fishing, environment and health, 
communications, and water resources. Oman opened a commercial office of the Sultanate 
in Bandar Abbas, allowing the export of Omani products through Iran to Central Asian 
countries’ markets, utilizing the railway line, which connects Bandar Abbas and areas of 
Central Asian countries bordering Iran, in return for Iran opening a shopping center in 





Muscat. Iran welcomed the revitalization of Omani investments. The security and safety 
of the Strait of Hormuz was a strong incentive to sign a security agreement between the 
two countries.57  
Othman points out that agreement made Qatar and Iran agree on more security 
cooperation in 2000, especially concerning the fight against drugs and smuggling, fraud, 
and organized crime. In November 2001, Iran formed an upper level committee to 
monitor the development of the Arab market for Iranian products, especially in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain.58 Iran opened doors to the nationals of the Gulf states, resulting in 
canceling the need for visas for the citizens of those countries who wanted to stay for 
three months or less, to facilitate the freedom to travel and the movement of trade and 
investors. However, security concerns in January 2002 motivated Iran to reverse this 
decision to prevent the infiltration of fighters from the “Al Qaeda” to the territory. The 
Iranian Secretary of Defense followed up with a visit to Qatar on January 25, 2006.59 
Evidence shows that Iran would like to break free of the isolation imposed on the 
country. These relations can be used by Arab countries as a strategy of “soft power” to 
dissuade Iran from completing its nuclear program. Arab countries negotiate using 
modern era mechanisms of logic and mediation to break the isolation of the Iranian 
economy and at the same time neutralize the risks and the attempts to dominate the Gulf 
region and to act as the Gulf police. 
 THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS D.
Steven Ohren talks about the Islamic Revolution ousted in 1979 against 
Mohammad Reza Shah by Ayatollah Khomeini. The first thing the new government did 
was establish the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Since that time, the IRGC 
has had the military power to influence the country’s economy and foreign policy; it also 





controls the INP. The IRGC has outside influence like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the 
Shiite paramilitaries all over the Gulf states.60 
The IRGC played a leading role during the first Gulf War, where there were many 
battles to regain control of several Iranian cities and take them back from the Iraqi army. 
The general mobilization of the IRGC forces included the naval and air force intelligence, 
as well as its own forces and Special Forces. There are in its ranks 90,000 regular soldiers 
and about 300,000 reservists. Observers believe that the IRGC plays a big role in 
supporting the Islamic resistance movements in Israel under the guise of such groups as 
the Lebanese Hezbollah’s Party. This prompted the United States to classify the IRGC as 
a terrorist organization. The IRGC uses several types of weapons. These include 
missiles/tanks/fighter, jets, and a large section of homemade weapons.61 
 THE EQUILIBRIUM OF POWER BETWEEN IRAN AND THE GULF E.
STATES  
According to Cordesman and Kleiber, there is an imbalance in the balance of 
power between Iran and the Gulf states in Iran’s favor.62 Iran possesses newer and more 
sophisticated weapons than any of the other Gulf states. Table 1 shows the balance of 
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Table 1.   The Balance of Power between Iran and Gulf States
63 
Manpower Iran Iraq* Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE Yemen 
Total Active 545,000 136,000 11,200 15,500 41,700 12,400 199,500 50,500 66,700 




125,000 0 0 0 6400 0 75,000 0 0 
Reserve 350,000 0 0 23,700 0 0  0 40,000 
Paramilitary 40,000+ 25,400+ 10,160 4,400 4,400 0 15,500+ 0 70,000 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, there is rapprochement between Iran and individual Gulf 
states. The defense budget is significantly higher in Saudi Arabia ($27.2 billion). The 
Iranian defense budget does not exceed $9.1 billion.  
                                                 
63 Ibid.3 
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Table 2.   The Balance of Military Forces in 2007 between Iran and Gulf 
States64 
 
Table 2 displays statistical data and comparisons between individual Gulf states 
and Iran. For example, Iran has more troops (545,000), while the number of troops in all 
the Gulf states’ combined forces is 533,500. That Gulf states collectively own more tanks 
(2,029) compared to Iran (1,565). The Gulf states collectively own more land-air missiles 
(178 batteries) compared to Iran (76 batteries). The Gulf states collectively own 573 
fighter jets, and Iran has 306. The Gulf states collectively owns 93 naval units, while Iran 
has 59 and an additional three submarines. The Gulf states combined have 25 patriot 
missile batteries, while Iran has none. The Gulf states combined have a defense budget of 
$34.715 billion, while Iran’s defense budget does not exceed $9.1 billion. 
Cordesman, and Kleiber point out that the Gulf states are superior to Iran in 
military strength in every aspect except for the number of troops. Iran is seeking to 


























34 - 20 27.2 
UAE 516 8 batteries 8 batteries 18 - - - 
Oman 153 50 50 13 - - 2.4 
Kuwait 290 10 10 10 - 5 3.3 
Qatar 30 75 75 7 - - 1.5 
Bahrain 140 2 2 11 - - 0.315 
TOTAL 2029 178 178 93 - 25 34.715 
Iraq & 
Yemen  
Iraq and Yemen military forces are suffering after the fall of the previous regimes 
from the interception of the armed militias and the Houthis in Yemen precisely, which 
in turn led to weak military powers. 
Iran 1565 76 306 59 3 2 9.1 
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acquire nuclear weapons to compensate for this deficiency and to increase its ability to 
extend its impact in the Gulf region with a nuclear weapon as a strategic deterrent. Iran 
excels in range of missiles, as well as in its ability to manufacture those rockets.65 
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III. THE REALITY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
AND DEVELOPMENTS  
Iran’s current strategy has four main priorities: preserving the Islamic regime, 
safeguarding Iran’s sovereignty, defending its nuclear ambitions, and expanding its 
influence in the region and the Islamic world. 
         −Peter Alsis, Marissa Allison, and Anthony Cordesman66 
 
Said Amir Arjomand argues that Iran has developed powerful nuclear power 
plants.67 This development was supported by the country’s quest to control the region. 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former governor of Iran, realized the importance of 
having nuclear capability to control the Gulf region and to maintain Iran’s position as a 
world power. This was important considering that nuclear power development is believed 
to give the country a significant voice in the region. Pahlavi’s desire to develop nuclear 
capability to control the gulf region was critical to the success of the industry. As a result, 
Iran sought to acquire and develop its nuclear capability as a move to join the nuclear 
club.68 
Arjomand points out that the United States approved of Iran’s program. This was 
due to friendly relations that existed with Iran during the rule of the Shah. However, after 
the successful Islamic revolution in the country, the Shah was no longer in power; the 
country was left under Khomeini’s rule. At the time, Iran’s leaders were not interested in 
nuclear power. They stopped the nuclear program, given that Iran had the means to 
produce cheaper energy, such as oil and gas. Iran’s war with Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s 
use of chemical weapons against the country led Iran’s leaders to begin appreciating the 
need to develop nuclear weapons.69 
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Arjomand contends that after the death of Khomeini, Iran understood the 
importance of acquiring powerful deterrent nuclear weapons for war. This context led 
Iran to revive the nuclear program under the pretext of using of nuclear energy to 
supplement energy needs in the country. The program’s main objective was to produce 
nuclear weapons that would serve as a means of deterring exposure to another chemical 
weapons attack. They also developed nuclear power to help the country establish control 
over the Gulf states region.70 
 PHASES OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR A.
PROJECT 
David Patrikarakos mentions that the evolution of the INP went through a number 
of phases before the process was a success. The INP passed through three important 
phases:71 
1. Phase I  
The first phase took place during the reign of the Shah of Iran. With the help of 
Germany, it established an integrated program of a nuclear reactor in the city of Bushehr. 
The partnership with Germany was critical in helping the company make gains in the 
business. The program saw Iran continue to construct new nuclear reactors south of 
Bushehr, with each plant having an output of 1200 MW of energy.72 
Patrikarakos points out that during this phase, the United States feared losing 
Iran’s contracts with American companies. Iran was urged to cancel contracts for reactors 
and nuclear plants with all other countries. The United States agreed to supply Iran with 
eight reactors to produce electricity. This package came with the provision to provide the 
nuclear fuel for these reactors and the basic methods and materials necessary for them to 
operate. However, the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini stopped the deal from 
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being implemented. The United States confiscated the $8 billion paid by Iran as part of 
the price of nuclear reactors.73 
Gar Smith argues that after the overthrow of the Shah, the termination of the 
contract to sell reactors and necessary nuclear fuel, and the confiscation of $8 billion, all 
nuclear development work on the reactors stopped completely in Bushehr.
74
 U.S. 
opposition to Khomeini led the United States to stop the flight of hundreds of Iranian 
scientists. The United States further enacted a ban on the export of nuclear technology. 
The U.S. decision happened was after it succumbed to pressure from both Germany and 
France to stop its cooperation with the Iranian government until sufficient assurances 
were made that Iran would be using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. In this 
context, Iran was pressured to allow international inspection committees to inspect Iran’s 
nuclear facilities.75 
2. Phase II 
David Albright and Andrea Stricker argue that Phase II occurred after Iraq’s war 
with Iran.76 In this war, Iraq bombed Iran with chemical weapons. The attack made Iran 
leaders realize the importance of owning a nuclear weapon of deterrence to counter 
possible threats. Iran turned to revive the nuclear program, especially after the 
deterioration of the Iranian army. Iran asked a German company to complete the Bushehr 
reactor. Germany’s failure to accept Iran’s request forced Iran to appeal to Russia to 
complete the construction of the Bushehr reactor. The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei 
Kozyrev, announced Russia’s willingness to supply Iran with civilian nuclear technology. 
Besides, Iran entered into a deal with Argentinian and Spanish companies based on 
recommendations from the German company in 1978. Meanwhile, in June 1981, an 
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Israeli air strike demolished Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research facility. Also, in the period 
between 1984 and 1987, Iraq attacked Iran’s Bushehr nuclear.77  
Fathi Mamduh argues that effort enabled Iran to expand the nuclear structure by 
developing its technical and scientific capacity for the workers in the nuclear field.78 
Additionally, Iran invited nuclear scientists to return home. The country further sent 
missions to the Iranian cadres to receive advanced scientific training in nuclear fields. As 
a result, the research in the nuclear field was enhanced and developed in Iran.79 
3. Phase III 
Iran made deliberate and steady progress in its quest to achieve the full nuclear fuel 
cycle. It advanced its uranium-mining infrastructure, uranium conversion capabilities, 
indigenous heavy water reactor and associated heavy water production plant, and 
uranium enrichment programs. 
–David Albright and Andrea Stricker80 
 
Albright and Stricker point out that Phase III was a significant phase leading to 
the current crisis facing the INP and its international relations with the United States and 
other countries. The phase began at the end of the second Gulf War in 1991 and the 
subsequent breakup of the former Soviet Union. During this period, Iranian leaders 
realized that a nuclear force could be exploited by regional and international variables. 
This action forced Iran to push for Islamic power on matters to do with its nuclear 
development. Iran’s quest for Islamic leadership led to its possible confrontation with the 
United States. Owning nuclear weapons may cause the United States to enter this 
confrontation reluctantly. This was because of the consequences being too great 
compared to Iran’s desire to build and lead an Islamic bloc of non-Arab countries on the 
continent of Asia. Despite the imposition of a total ban by the United States on Iran, and 
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pressure on Russia and other Iran providers of nuclear technology, Iran continued to 
obtain nuclear capabilities. 
Ahmed Mohamoud, deputy chief editor of the Arab Strategic Report argues that 
Iran took advantage of the collapse of the former Soviet Union.81 The collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) allowed Iran to import nuclear warheads 
from the Islamic republics in Asia, which increased its nuclear input. Besides, Iran 
imported atomic scientists from the former Soviet Union to work in Iran’s nuclear 
facilities. Mohamoud points out that Iran signed an agreement with China to cooperation 
in nuclear development. In this agreement, China provided electromagnetic devices, an 
experimental nuclear reactor, private medical diagnoses, a nuclear research facility, 
training/education, equipment for nuclear physics, and the production of radioactive 
isotopes to Iran. In addition, Iran renewed a request made by the former Shah to deliver 
steam generators used in cooling nuclear reactors from Italy. This phase ended with 
success after Iran and major powers P5+1 ((group of six countries get together in 2006 
about INP which are: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and 
Germany) reached an historic agreement for the continuation of the INP. This was after 
Iran provided guarantees that its nuclear power was to be used for peaceful purposes. 
This appears to be the beginning of the real threat to the Gulf states. This came against 
the background of Iran’s public declaration that they have the right to possess nuclear 
facilities. The worry was that acquisition may lead to the domination of Iran over the 
Gulf states and threaten the security and stability of the region.82 
 THE MOST IMPORTANT IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES B.
Iran’s growing interest to acquire nuclear capabilities was reflected in the 
successful creation of many nuclear facilities. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, 
developments were accelerated because Iran’s leaders had realized the importance of 
nuclear weapons as an effective deterrence weapon. For Iran, the move was significant in 
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helping it be protected from possible attacks with chemical weapons, or possibly even 
nuclear weapons. The developments also allowed them the ability to impose their 
influence and dominate the Gulf region.  
Figure 1 shows the most important Iranian nuclear facilities and their capabilities. 




The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) points out that Bushehr is located on the 
Arabian Gulf coast.84 Two reactors were constructed for energy production but not 
completed during the reign of the Shah. Each reactor is capable of producing 1200 MW. 
These are the two reactors, which the German company refused to finish due to pressure 
from the United States. Russia finished the installation of hardware and technical 
equipment. They are at the center of the INP in question. 
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(2) Gorgan 
Emanuele Ottolenghi points out that the program was located on the Caspian 
coast.85 The program was developed with Russia’s support. Russia built two reactors, 
where each is capable of producing 440 MW. The Mujahideen Khalq Organization 
indicated that the reactor was installed in the huge Russian site in Gorgan on the Caspian 
Sea. Its installation was conducted under the supervision of Russian physicists. 
(3) DarKhovin 
The NTI points out that DarKhovin is located in the province of Khuzestan near 
the city of Ahvaz, where the Chinese constructed two reactors, each capable of producing 
360 MW.86 The Mujahideen Khalq Organization has reported that China has offered to 
Iran the equipment and technicians to enrich uranium on this site.  This was supposed to 
be a French nuclear power plant capable of producing 935 MW, but the project has not 
been completed to date. 
(4) Tehran 
Al J. Venter states that Tehran has a small research reactor built during the reign 
of the Shah, capable of producing 5 MW.87 This reactor was built by the United States in 
1967. It is dedicated for research purposes. The reactor cannot be used for the production 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. 
(5) Kleih Landmarks 
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Rodhan point out that Kleih landmarks is located 
near the Caspian Sea region of northwest of Tehran. It is a dedicated center of military 
nuclear research.88 Iran wanted to collaborate with India to build a nuclear reactor 
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capable of producing 10 MW in this location, but this was canceled. Today, the site has 
been used to train the Iranian Organization for Nuclear energy personnel. 
(6) Isfahan 
“The central Iranian city of Isfahan is believed to be the core of the Islamic 
Republic’s nuclear weapons program.” 
−Ilan Berman
89 
According to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Isfahan is 
a military research center where experts from China and North Korea worked.90 This 
does not contain any nuclear reactors, although it is designed to incorporate a nuclear 
reactor capable of producing 27 MW.  
(7) Karaj 
According to NTI, Karaj is located near Tehran and is used for medical and 
agricultural purposes. It contains a cyclotron or nuclear accelerator for research 
purposes.91 The center is believed not to produce nuclear weapons for war.  
(8) Saghand 
Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi mentions that Saghand is located in the central province of 
Yazd, Iran.92 It is a uranium mine and does not contain nuclear facilities. It has huge 
amounts of uranium, up to 5,000 tons at the very least. In 1987, Iran announced that it 
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(9) Buroujerd 
This program is located in the Khorasan province near the border with 
Turkmenistan. The British company MW Kellogg is building a factory for the production 
of ammonia and urea, which can possibly be modified to produce heavy water.93 
(10) Tabriz 
Adrian Stubbs mentions that the local population of this site was forced to leave 
the region; the IRGC built a series of regular industrial complexes, which are just a 
camouflage.94 “Smoke, steam, and debris from the explosion shot hundreds of feet into 
the night sky from the chemical site deep inside the mountain.”95 
Gulf states believe that Iran’s insistence on the distribution of nuclear facilities in 
all parts of Iran (away from residential areas) and the displacement of the population near 
these facilities is clear evidence that its nuclear facilities are producing nuclear weapons. 
This issue is a source of concern and a threat to Gulf Arab neighbors and the Middle East. 
But Iran insists that the nuclear program is for peaceful energy, not a bomb. These 
facilities are to produce energy for peaceful uses.96 
 THE THREATS FACING THE GULF STATES IN THE EVENT OF THE C.
COMPLETION OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT  
Jameel Althyabi argues that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will increase its 
domination and control over the Gulf region.97 One of powers that Iran may have is 
exporting chaos to the neighboring Gulf states in an attempt to give the ruling time to 
Shiite. Iran’s foreign policy intervenes in the internal affairs of the Gulf states: it stirs 
Shiite minorities, supports them, and incites them to claim their rights. Iran’s policy 
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depends on military support like what is happening nowadays in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, 
and Bahrain. Iran is trying to increase control of the Strait of Hormuz over Oman to 
deprive the Arab States of their ability to export gas and oil. This has resulted in the 
emergence of extremist organizations, whether of the Salafist jihadi or al-Qaeda, and the 
emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). They do this by restricting traffic 
in the Gulf and threatening passing ships and oil tankers, which threatens unrest in the 
Gulf states.98 
Althyabi argues that if the INP is completed, possible threats in the Gulf area 
might escalate, exporting violence, chaos, and terror. From the GCC’s perspective, when 
Iran owns nuclear weapons, the first result is exported violence, chaos, and terror to the 
Gulf states. This would be through working to exploit the Shiites who are in the Gulf 
states. After that, Iran would create chaos and internal strife, and even give an excuse to 
intervene to protect the Shiite minorities in the Gulf states.99 
Althyabi says that Iran would like to export its successful experience in Iraq to 
neighboring Gulf states through the militarization of extremist groups and financial 
support to certain political parties, such as Hezbollah, the pro-Iran force in Lebanon. Iran 
designated logistical and human support missions to these groups and parties for creating 
disturbances and confusion within the governments and security systems of these 
countries. They look forward to creating chaos and unrest, and bringing instability with 
the intention of increasing lawlessness and creating strong justification for its 
intervention to protect the Shiites. Iran’s plans for expansion have become clear in that 
Iran is seeking to create internal sectarian problems for the purposes of penetrating other 
countries in the region.100 Althyabi also mentions that the completion of the INP might 
encourage the dissemination of extremist ideology in order to ignite revolutions and 
overthrow the governments. The region may seek to promote certain extremist religious 
ideas through rights and social justice.101 






Christin Maraschall states that Iran and major powers 5 +1 reached a historic 
agreement in November 2013 on the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program on the 
condition that its use be peaceful.102 It is difficult to predict Iran’s intentions or determine 
whether it is committed to developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The United 
States also confirmed that it does not rule out a military option to resolve the Iranian 
nuclear file, alongside Israel repeatedly confirmed warnings about Iran’s possession of 
nuclear weapons, and has threatened to launch an air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities as 
they did with the Iraqi nuclear reactor.103 
Bernard and Gotowicki argue that the Iranian response to the American or Israeli 
attacks may lead to the participation of the Gulf states already in the war, especially if 
Iran attacks airbases or U.S. Naval vessels in the Gulf states.104 This may lead to regional 
war that threatens the security of the Gulf states. It may also affect the security and 
stability in the entire region. 
 FROM A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE D.
Özden Oktav argues that there is a bigger threat, namely, the difficulty of 
reaching a common formula for the security of the Gulf region.105 Iran demands to have a 
role in the Gulf security arrangements and urges Gulf states to reject the foreign presence 
in general and the U.S. presence in particular, which it sees as guaranteeing security and 
protection from Iran’s expansion ambitions. In this regard, Iran launched several formats 
for the security of the Gulf states, which was risky because of the possibility of a nuclear 
arms race, which is not confined to the Gulf states. The rationale behind this dilemma is 
that such risk may extend to all the Arab countries that would seek to acquire nuclear 
weapons to achieve a strategic balance with Iran.106 As noted by Prince Turki Al-Faisal, 
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petitioning Riyadh to acquire nuclear weapons in the case of Iran’s possession of similar 
weapons. Therefore, the GCC needs to get guarantees from the international community 
to establish a joint security formula with the regional parties in the Gulf states, including 
Iran. Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons leads to strained relations and focuses on 
good-neighborly relations, and enhances mutual trust. There are also benefits to 
renouncing the use of force, instead solving problems through negotiation and 
constructive dialogue.107 
Mohamed Edres argues that the possible radioactive contamination could be 
devastating to the Gulf states and the entire region.108  The health of the people in the 
region is at risk: they are threatened by increased environmental changes because of the 
nuclear waste. Proximity to Iran’s nuclear facilities exposes Gulf states to the devastating 
effects on people and the environment from radioactive contamination. The nuclear 
reactor of Bushehr is located just 280 kilometers from Kuwait and depends on imported 
technologies from Russia. These Russian technologies do not have guaranteed nuclear 
safety elements, putting the Gulf states at risk in the event of any radioactive leakage, 
which could be transmitted by the wind as deadly radiation crosses the Gulf.109 Iran may 
also dispose of nuclear waste in the Arabian Gulf, which is where the Gulf states obtain 
fresh water through desalination plants. There is a potential for a serious pollution crisis 
if there is leakage of radioactive nuclear material. The negative effects on all those who 
use water in the neighboring Gulf states and the possibility of contracting different types 
of deadly diseases can create a continuous negative impact for decades, as well as the 
possible destabilization of economic security.110  
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Kristian Ulrichsen argues that the concept of Gulf security is at risk, and Iranian 
dominance is a bigger threat to the region’s stability.111 This is through Iran’s threat to 
close the Strait of Hormuz and to attack foreign ships in the Arabian Gulf. This has 
threatened to hamper the export of oil from the Gulf states, which depend on oil as their 
main source of income. It is evident that the Gulf states face serious threats from Iran’s 
possession of expansionism with nuclear capabilities that enable them to own and 
manufacture nuclear weapons, causing an imbalance of power in the region. Iran takes 
advantage of its nuclear capability to impose its hegemony and control the Arab countries 
and encourages rumors to promote anxiety in the Gulf states to expand political unrest. In 
addition, one threat is closing the Gulf states and cutting off income.112 The Gulf states 
have to be careful and keep Iran from achieving its ambitions in the region. Iran uses its 
authority and dominance in the economic, political, and military fields, so Iran might be 
able to exert control, either directly or indirectly.113 
The researcher believes that Iran still has the right to develop its INP for peaceful 
use, but Iranian foreign policy is still accused of interfering in the affairs of neighboring 
countries, and the most important aspects of the chaos that Iran is exploiting are meant to 
destabilize the security and stability of the Gulf states. It might also mean creating chaos 
through inciting the Shiites in Bahrain and Yemen to demonstrate and seize the 
Presidential Palace. Iran still tries to do the same thing to Shiites in the Eastern Province 
in Saudi Arabia by encouraging them to take the positions of opposition from Saudi 
regimes. Iran further demands autonomy for Shiites and the right to enjoy the revenues of 
oil more than the rest of the cities of the kingdom, as the oil fields located in their 
territory. In addition, from an Arab perspective, completing the INP will possibly expose 
the Gulf to the risk of war. Iran’s persistence to acquire nuclear weapons could ignite 
wars in the Arabian Gulf region between the United States and its allies, and Iran.  
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 THE EFFORTS OF THE GULF STATES TO FACE THE IRANIAN E.
NUCLEAR PROJECT  
James H. Lebovic argues that there were varied reactions in the international 
community over the INP.114 Some states refused to project the threat to the neighboring 
Gulf region and the Middle East, both in terms of the imposition of Iranian hegemony or 
in terms of radioactive contamination that may occur, and threatens the entire Gulf 
region, its displays, and its citizens. The countries that supported Iran’s possession of 
nuclear capabilities in peaceful areas (Russia, North Korea, and China) argue that Iran is 
incapable of producing nuclear weapons and that Iran just wants uranium at a rate 
ranging between 3.5 percent to 4.0 percent; the proportion is non-sufficient for the 
production of nuclear weapons.  
In 2006, leaders of the GCC announced, during the “Jaber Summit” in Riyadh, the 
start of a joint study to build a peaceful nuclear program.115 In a turn of events, the Emir 
of Qatar confirmed the danger of the Gulf states region in the presence of two nuclear 
countries. On the outskirts of the region are India and Pakistan, in addition to Iran’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, which makes Gulf and Arab countries vulnerable. In 2009, 
the Emir’s concerns forced the UAE to establish the Nuclear Energy Corporation. In 
pursuit of its commitment, Saudi Arabia in 2014 signed an energy agreement with China 
after the completion of King Abdullah City, with respect to atomic and renewable 
energy.116  
The researcher notices that the efforts of Gulf states are not sufficient to counter 
the risks to those countries. Attitudes are still not unified in that regard. Even if Iran 
acquired a nuclear weapon, it could not be used in the Gulf region because there would 
be consequences. The big problem is that the possession of this weapon may allow Iran to 
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impose its control and threaten the Gulf states. A potential confrontation may destabilize 
the security of Middle East. 
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IV. STRATEGIC VISION IN THE FACE OF THE IRANIAN 
NUCLEAR PROJECT 
Iran has been tirelessly spending massive amounts of money to pursue its nuclear 
program. It all started when Iran signed a contract with the United States in 1957 to 
establish twenty-three nuclear power plants to produce energy for peaceful purposes.117 
Then, in 1976, Iran contracted with Germany to build a nuclear reactor in Bushehr and to 
train Iranian technicians in the field of nuclear physics.118 Within a year, Germany 
refused to complete construction of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, and Iran immediately 
started negotiations with Russia to complete the job. Soon thereafter, Iran purchased 
highly enriched fissile materials from Russia and Argentina. In 1990, Iran signed an 
agreement with China to complete the nuclear plans and to train Iranian scientists at the 
Chinese Nuclear Research Center.119 
Iran did not get approval from the international community to continue its nuclear 
program. For example, the United States, the European Union, and Israel expressed their 
serious concerns over Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities.120 The United States 
successfully limited Iran’s nuclear ambitions by stalling construction. In addition, the 
United States elicited European approval and imposed strict regulations on the export of 
nuclear technology that Iran demanded. Furthermore, the United States exerted political 
and economic pressure on countries that cooperated with Iran to prevent them from 
providing help that might allow Iran to possess nuclear capabilities. The thought was that 
Iran’s economy would likely collapse and its leadership would face a public revolution 
and lose power.121 
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Jeffrey Boutwell points out that Arab countries rejected Iran’s possession of 
nuclear capabilities.122 For example, Egypt disliked the INP because Iran did not face 
threats that justified its possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iran’s possession of 
nuclear weapons disturbed the strategic balance in the Gulf region. The Gulf states 
specifically expressed their concern about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran has a 
reputation of supporting and practicing terrorism, which increases the concern over Iran’s 
nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, Iran interfered with the internal affairs of the GCC and 
occupied three UAE islands in the Gulf, declaring that they were under Iranian 
sovereignty.123 
Khalil Hussein believes that it is essential that the Gulf states form a strategic 
vision for facing any possible dangers that result from the completion of the INP.124 The 
Gulf states have sought to abort the project through the use of their political, economic, 
and strategic weight in the international community. This includes all possible peaceful 
ways to stop the project. At the same time, the Gulf states are creating their own nuclear 
projects in the region to provide a counter balance to any possible Iranian threats.125 The 
Iranian threat is not only the nuclear program, but also ambition to expand and gain 
control in the region. This raises many concerns for Gulf states and has led to their 
mistrust of Iran. Furthermore, Iran has proven to have no commitment to good neighborly 
relations by its constant attempts to change the demographic structure of the Gulf Arab 
region, by influencing some minority groups in the region using their religious allies 
(Shiites) and promoting sectarianism in the region, which is a big threat to the Gulf 
countries’ security and stability.126 
                                                 
122 Jeffrey Boutwell and Joseph Rotblat, Addressing the Nuclear Weapons Threat: The Russell-
Einstein Manifesto Fifty Years On (Rome, Italy: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 
2005), 78. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Hussein Khalil, “Iran’s Nuclear Program Gulf Security Concerns,” BlogSpot, March 14, 2008, 
http://drkhalilhussein.blogspot.com. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid.  
 39 
The Gulf states’ strategic vision to confront the Iranian project is composed of 
two dimensions. The first encompasses the use of soft power in different fields, such as 
economies and politics. Also, the Gulf states should make use of all available strategic 
tools, including, but not limited to, their relationship with United States and the 
international community’s rejection of the project. The second dimension has a protective 
vision that involves creating a nuclear project in the Gulf to restore the strategic balance 
and to protect the Gulf states from any possible threats.127  
 FIRST DIMENSION: SOFT POWER A.
It is crucial for Gulf states to use soft power strategies first when dealing with 
Iran. They must also benefit from the existing affinity between Iran and the region, as 
was positively encouraged by Iran’s leaders Rafsanjani and Khatami.128 Using this kind 
relationship could encourage cooperation and be useful in convincing Iran to stop its 
nuclear project. As mentioned in previous chapters, the INP threatened the safety of the 
Gulf states before it threatened the United States and its allies. The INP could also lead to 
a devastating war in the region, and the Gulf states, including Iran, will pay the price.  
Soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye, is “the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and policies.”129 This implies the exclusion of military  means. 
Soft power also uses civilizational, economic, and promotional means of achieving its 
goal. Economic means can also be used and can prove to be quite effective for Gulf–
Iranian relations. Therefore, Gulf states must employ as much political power as possible 
to control to negotiations with Iran and Iran’s behavior and interests in the region. Using 
soft power can also include cultural and ideological means, which might create a general 
opinion in the region opposing the completion of the INP.130 
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Moreover, soft power may be used in political and economic arenas. For example, 
in the politics, Gulf states must use political weight, influence, and shared interests (oil 
and gas) with the United States and the European Union by stressing that any possible 
Iranian threat to the region could result in the inability to export oil and gas. If oil and gas 
production and exportation stops, it will lead to serious consequences on a global scale 
and possibly to economic collapse in a large part of the world. Therefore, Gulf states 
should try to persuade international powers to seriously oppose the completion of the 
INP, or at least manage to have guarantees that the nuclear capacities will be used for 
peaceful purposes only. 
1. Political Soft Power Strategy 
Nathan Gonzalez points out that Gulf states should use soft power in politics 
using several means.131 First, they should have a balanced dialogue with Iran to 
discourage its nuclear project. If the project is completed, Iran must provide assurances 
that it will use its nuclear capacities for peaceful purposes, so it will not be a threat to the 
safety and security of the Gulf states and the region. In addition, during international 
forums, the Gulf states should emphasize the importance of making the region of the 
Arab Gulf free from weapons of mass destruction.132 
Mabon Simon argues that soft power should work in accordance with the closing 
statement of the 31st GCC summit, which took place in Abu Dhabi in 2010.133 It is 
necessary to coordinate successfully between the Gulf states through GCC and the Arab 
League. This coordination will lead to a joint Arab–Gulf strategy to set the minimal 
political approach to contain Iran without causing any national or regional conflicts. The 
continuation of the negotiations between Western countries and Tehran gives hope of 
reaching a peaceful solution that the INP be used for peaceful purposes only. Moreover, 
the announcement aims to reach a political agreement that circumvents any concerns 
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about the project. In addition to achieve stability in the region, Iran has the right to use 
the nuclear power for peaceful purposes under the standards and instructions of the 
IAEA.  
Zafer Alajmi believes that the strategic importance of the Gulf region should 
prepare a joint approach to prioritize Arab’s cases, starting with national goals, which 
will lead to the common regional goal.134 It is essential that Arab countries continue the 
open dialogue to assure trust and collaboration, which will lead to a common national 
strategy. Alajmi urges the region to identify political frameworks in order to use the joint 
military power as the Peninsula Shield Force through the military cooperation between 
the Gulf states to prevent any security vacuum that allows an external intervention in the 
region. The GCC has to restore the security policies of Gulf States so that they can 
achieve a higher level of national security through identifying the sources of threats and 
the means to confront them. 
Alajmi argues that Gulf states have to remind the United States and the EU that 
Iran will use its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes only.135 These guarantees are 
necessary, given the importance of the Arab Gulf supplying the industrial world with 60 
percent of its oil and gas needs. Moreover, any threats to the security of Gulf region will 
likely have an impact on oil production.136 
The political status of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, may play an 
important role in securing the region without any direct confrontations with Iran. It is 
possible because of Saudi Arabia’s political influence on the international community 
and its continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance all over the world. In 
addition, Saudi Arabia positively supports regional and international issues. It has also 
taken a strong stand and refused an offered seat as a non-permanent member in the UN. 
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2. Economic Soft Power Strategy 
Ashraf Kishk, researcher at the Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International, and 
Energy Studies, argues that, at the international economic level, the Gulf states possess 
the most important element in the form of oil.137 The economy of the United States, the 
EU, and many other countries depends greatly on the oil of the Gulf States. Therefore, the 
Gulf states could use it to persuade the United States, the EU, and the other countries to 
pressure Iran into using its nuclear program for peaceful purposes, which will guarantee 
the safety and security of the region. In terms of regional economics, there is an 
enormous commercial exchange between the Gulf states and Iran. The Gulf states 
comprise the largest commercial market, and Iran benefits a great deal by having them as 
their main importers. This can be used to force Iran to rethink its nuclear project, either 
by canceling it, or by carefully using it for peaceful purposes only.138 
Kishk points out that the economy could be used in negotiations with Iran, as also 
demonstrated in the commercial benefits between them and Iran. In 2003, the total trade 
volume between Iran and Kuwait was $180 million, but in past years, it did not exceed 
$40 million. In 2004, the total trade volume between Saudi Arabia and Iran raised to 2 
billion Saudi Rial (SR). In 2003, the total volume trade between Bahrain and Iran 
amounted to $68 million. Despite the Iranian-Emirati controversy about UAE’s islands, 
the total trade volume between the UAE and Iran reached $4.4 million in 2003.139 This 
constitutes the equivalent of 13.5 percent of the total volume trade between Iran and the 
rest of the countries. Moreover, the UAE market is the third most important one for Iran; 
it is also classified as the fifth country in supplying Iran with goods. Iran is also 
considered one of the most important markets for the UAE in the field of re-export and 
import.140 
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Kishk argues that the Gulf states are capable of influencing the INP, or at least 
capable of getting the country to provide strong commitments that it will not use its 
nuclear capacities to produce nuclear weapons. The Gulf states could use their economic 
power by lowering commercial trade gradually between them and Iran, or by interrupting 
trade completely, if necessary. By doing so, the Gulf states could apply some pressure on 
Iran and make it rethink the use of its nuclear capabilities and rethink its desires to 
dominate the region.141  
 SECOND DIMENSION: CREATING A GULF NUCLEAR PROJECT B.
It is apparent that Iran is determined to complete its nuclear project under any 
circumstances, stating that it will use these nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes.142 
President of Iran Ahmadinejad announced that it is Iran’s legitimate right to continue its 
nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it is logical that the Gulf states could 
have their own nuclear programs and nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, like Iran. 
It is necessary to create a strategic balance in the region, which could protect the Gulf 
states from any possible threat or Iran’s attempts to dominate and expand in the region. 
The leaders of the GCC announced that the Arab States of the Gulf started a joint study to 
create a peaceful nuclear project as a response to Iran’s continuation with its nuclear 
project. The secretary general of the GCC confirmed conducting meetings with officials 
from the Atomic Energy Agency regarding the Gulf nuclear project.143  
 COUNTRIES’ POSITIONS TO THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT C.
The reactions of countries all over the world to the INP have been diverse. 
Despite the fact that some of these countries, including the Gulf states, declared that Iran 
has the right to possess nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes only, there is mainly 
fear of the idea that Iran might be able to possess nuclear weapons. There is also strong 
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motivation and desire to stop or stall the INP, or at least guarantee the use of that nuclear 
power for peaceful purposes only.144 
1. The Gulf States Level 
Given common commercial, security and strategic interests, including with Iran, Gulf 
states should be able to protect themselves or reach a satisfactory accommodation with 
non-Arab neighbors through cooperation. 
–Seale Patrick.145 
Seale Patrick argues that the Gulf states did not address or negotiate directly with 
Iran regarding its nuclear program.146 Also, the Gulf states did not try to convince Iran of 
the necessity of suspending uranium enrichment. However, Iran’s pursuit to own nuclear 
weapons worried the Gulf States, especially after the increase of information about Iran’s 
support and practice of terrorism. Therefore, despite the importance of the commercial 
trade between the Gulf states and Iran, the Gulf states believe that improving the actual 
relationship with Iran would not happen until Iran commits not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the Gulf states and to respect the Gulf States’ sovereignty, independence, and 
peaceful cohabitation that is obtained from heritage and religion.  
The Gulf states considered Iran’s occupation of the UAE islands (Abu Musa, and 
the Greater and the Lesser Tunbs) to be a threat to the security and the stability of the 
region. Nevertheless, Iran rejected the GCC’s statement regarding the three UAE islands, 
and the Iranian Shura Council issued a declaration considering the UAE islands to be 
under the sovereignty of Iran. Furthermore, the ministers of the GCC expressed their 
concern and fear regarding Iran’s intention to buy medium-range missiles, which are able 
to carry chemical warheads, from North Korea. There is also great concern regarding 
Iranian support of terrorism and its involvement in financing and supporting terrorists 
organizations in Egypt, Algeria, and other Arab countries. Moreover, the lack of trust in 
Iran’s nuclear intentions has become the Gulf states’ nightmare, and they tried to get 
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guarantees and promises of support from the United States to protect them from the 
possible threats if Iran proves to possess nuclear weapons. The Gulf states consider the 
United States to be their strongest alley capable of confronting the INP.147 
Cohen argues the refusal from the Gulf states to adopt a competitive style with 
Iran that possessed developed military programs in light of the subsistence of the Gulf 
states suffering from the Iraqi issue and its implications.148 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and since 1974 has strongly favored the idea of making of the Middle 
East a region void of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the IAEA did not find 
any evidence that proved that the country had breached any obligations of the treaty. Iran 
agreed to the inspection of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant by international experts from 
the IAEA. The country also agreed to put the nuclear power plant under their surveillance 
and to proceed with international inspections on its nuclear programs in accordance with 
the same inspections done in Iraq. The IAEA proceeded to inspect the declared Iranian 
sites, but it also visited two suspected sites twice. In February 1992, the IAEA visited six 
suspected sites. However, it did not find any trace of activity associated with the 
production of weapons in that region. The IAEA found that the uranium mine in 
Saghand’s area needed five years to be productive, and that it did not possess uranium 
enrichment plants. The IAEA also found that the plant of Kalaiya Landmarks in Iran 
(Maalem Kalaiya) looked like a conference and training center the size of a small hotel, 
and that the cyclotron given by China could be used for medical purposes only. Iran 
allowed a new team from the IAEA to visit suspected facilities. This visit did not differ 
from the last one.149 
During the 26th summit of the GCC held in Abu Dhabi in December 2005, the 
secretary general expressed the region’s fears of Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons.150 
He mentioned that the GCC did not wish for a nuclear race in the region. The GCC did 
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not issue any statement directly related to the INP; instead, it requested that Israel join the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), and to expose all of its nuclear 
facilities to international inspection committees of the IAEA.151 The Gulf states 
considered the Council’s statements regarding the Israel’s nuclear power and the concern 
of the escalation and possible confrontation between Israel and Iran, which will be 
catastrophic for the entire region. Despite the Gulf states’ worry over Iran’s possession of 
nuclear weapons, the states enjoy a good economic and political relationship with Iran.152 
During the Gulf states’ Summit “Jaber” in Riyadh in December 2006, the 
secretary general of the GCC mentioned the necessity of having the region free of any 
weapons of mass destruction. The GCC announced that they are not against Iran’s 
possession of nuclear capabilities if used for peaceful purposes. The GCC added that the 
Gulf states also have the right, just like Iran and Israel, to have their own peaceful nuclear 
projects.153 
The closing statement of the 31st Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Abu Dhabi 
in 2010 ensured that it is essential that the Gulf states show their good intentions towards 
Iran. Additionally, the GCC statement encouraged the continued negotiations between the 
West and Teheran to reach a peaceful solution to the INP.154 Also, the statement ensured 
the right of all states to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the GCC 
also mentioned utilizing all means to clear the region of any weapons of mass 
destruction, requesting that Iran respond the international community requests regarding 











The fears of Gulf states are not devoid of reality given the loss of Iraq as a Sunni 
Arab bulwark and Iran’s consolidating influence there. For the Saudis, nuclear Iran is 
likely to intensify its Shia ascendency in Iraq and this sort of development would present 
an existential threat to Sunni Arab monarchies in the region. 
−Umair Jamal156 
Considering all aspects, it is evident that the INP would be very destabilizing to 
the Gulf states. Nevertheless, the GCC’s policies reflect awareness and understanding of 
the situation and suggest that escalating the situation will not benefit any of the parties 
involved. Also, Iran must guarantee to use the INP for peaceful purposes,157 not to 
mention preserving commercial and economic trade interests between Iran and the Gulf 
States.158 The Gulf states can use these points to pressure Iran to solve the problem of the 
UAE islands and to offer guarantees to ensure the INP for peaceful purposes.159 
2. The Arab Countries Level 
All Arab countries that do not belong to the Gulf region are against Iran’s 
possession of weapons of mass destruction, except the Palestinian Authority, which chose 
to be neutral. Egypt’s position was that Iran does not face any threats that could justify 
possessing nuclear weapons, and furthermore that such possession might affect the 
balance of power in the region.160 In addition are the serious risks to which the Gulf 
states are exposed if a radiation leak occurred through incompetence, negligence, or 
destruction by airstrikes from Israel or coalition forces.161 
Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa met 300 students at a Doha 
Debates Special Occasion on November 2006 in which the League called for keeping the 
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region of the Middle East clear from nuclear weapons.162 Moreover, the League took 
serious steps toward doing so and created an Arab Peace and Security Council, in 
addition to taking measures to organize and promote Arab national security. All the Arab 
countries, including Iran and Turkey, agreed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in the region. Furthermore, the Arab League stated that Iran has the right to 
possess nuclear capabilities to be used for peaceful purposes only, like any other country 
of the region. Many analysts argue that, because the Arab position rejects the INP, it 
follows that all Arab countries are aware of the risks resulting from the program. The 
presence of nuclear weapons in the region can form an imminent danger for the Gulf 
States, which will influence the U.S. and EU interests in the region.162F163 
3. The International Level 
Wexler argues that the countries’ positions diverged.164 However, they all agreed, 
except for Israel, on the completion of INP for peaceful purposes, providing strong 
guarantees. Turkey was not opposed to the peaceful INP. However, it feared, just like the 
Gulf states, that Iran might create nuclear weapons. Israel rejects the project, be it for 
peaceful or military purposes, and it opposed the completion of the INP, considering it a 
direct source of danger and a threat to security. Thus, Israel has carefully thought about 
directing air strikes to Iranian nuclear facilities. 
On the other hand, the United States and the EU continued their rejection for 
Iran’s possession of nuclear capacities, but that position was reversed recently by the G6 
or the G5+1 Summit on November 24, 2013. The new decision was for allowing Iran to 
continue its nuclear project under the condition that it will use its nuclear capabilities for 
peaceful purposes only.165 
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 PREVIOUS EFFORTS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO PREVENT D.
THE COMPLETION OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT  
Dima Adamsky argues that from 1992 to 2000, the United States attempted 
several times to stall or stop the INP using different political means.166 For example, after 
Russia signed the agreement with Iran to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor, the 
United States warned Russia to stop cooperation with a troubled country that supports 
and practices terrorism. Also, during a visit from Russian president Boris Yeltsin to 
Washington in 1994, the United States pressured Yelstin to declare that Russia will stop 
its arms sales to Tehran, except for the sales that had already been agreed upon in 
concluded contracts.167 In addition, the United States hindered Iran’s attempts to buy rare 
nuclear materials from Kazakhstan. The United States bought the entire factory stock of 
beryllium sufficient for manufacturing twenty nuclear warheads. The United States 
continuously warned Russia about the need to cancel the nuclear reactor agreements with 
Iran. Moreover, the United States pressured Britain, France, Argentina, Brazil, and India 
not to deal with Iran in the nuclear field. Indeed, India stopped its sale of nuclear reactors 
to Iran, which was supposed to be placed in the Bushehr station. The United States 
continued to pressure Russia until it pledged to cancel its arms deal with Iran, and China 
until it signed and declaration to stop its nuclear cooperation with Iran. The United States 
also hindered several Iranian nuclear transactions, such as the Iran’s purchase of a device 
from Argentina that transforms uranium into highly enriched uranium; that deal was 
never completed. The United States also imposed sanctions on some Russian companies 
that helped Iran in the development of its program to create missiles capable of carrying 
nuclear and chemical warheads.168 
The researcher observes that the change of the U.S. and the EU strategy regarding 
the INP and agreeing for peaceful purposes may lead only to calm the situation in the 
Gulf region in the near future. But in the long term, the program’s outcomes, threats, and 
impact to the region are unpredictable. In light of the existing race to obtain nuclear 
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capabilities for peaceful purposes, Gulf states and Arab countries are convinced that the 
possession of nuclear capacities leads to the production of nuclear weapons. This may 
lead to an increase of nuclear weapons in the region of the Arab Gulf and the Middle 
East, which will possibly raise tensions in the region and exchange of threats among its 
countries.  
 THE OBSTACLES LIMITING THE GULF STATES’ EFFORTS TO FACE E.
THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT 
The Gulf states have come to see Iran’s nuclear program as the shield that allows 
Iran’s sword its proxies, ideological and religious appeal, and propaganda efforts to 
penetrate the Arab world. 
−Dina Esfandiary, Elham Fakhro, and Becca Wasser
169 
 
Esfandiary, Fakhro, and Wasser argue that the Gulf states are faced with political 
and economic constraints that might obstruct their attempts to stop the INP, or at least to 
have guarantees that the INP will be used peacefully, especially, after the approval of the 
G6 or G5+1 in November 2013, that Iran can use the INP for peaceful purposes.170 
1. Political Constraints 
Basma Saeed argues that the Gulf states are faced with several political 
constraints that obstruct its success in dealing with the INP.171 The first of these 
constraints is the lack of political dialogue between Iran and the Gulf states, which is 
necessary to convince Iran to refrain from completing the INP, in addition to the lack of 
actual guarantees that Iran will use it for peaceful purposes. In addition, there is 
insufficient focus during the international forums on the importance of making the region 
free from weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the weakness of the Gulf states’ 
policies and their hesitation support the previous U.S. and the EU policy’s aim to strip 
Iran of its nuclear capabilities. Some of the Gulf states note that Iran has the right to 
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possess nuclear capabilities, just like Israel, and that the Gulf states have the right to 
possess nuclear capabilities as well. Hence, the Gulf states are unable to take a clear, joint 
political stand regarding the INP. In addition, the Gulf states are reluctant to engage in 
military confrontations with Iran.172 
Iranian leaders declared egotistically that they will attack the UAE if it spoke of 
the three islands problem again, and referred to Bahrain as the 14th province of Iran.173  
Iran also harbors ambitions to expand and colonize the entire region and revive the 
Persian Empire. Iran threatened Saudi Arabia that has constituted an Islamic Council to 
manage the pilgrimage (Hajj) affairs, which Saudis have been managing for almost 13 
centuries and which occur every year within Saudi Arabia in Makah and Medina. There 
is a lack of political willingness among the Gulf states to impose gradual economic 
sanctions and decrease commercial trading with Iran, which might pressure Iran to stop 
the INP or offers strong guarantees that the project will not be used to create nuclear 
weapons. Althyabi notes that there is a shortage of integrated coordination among the 
Gulf states through the GCC and the Arab League to agree to policies that will permit 
Iran to possess nuclear capacities without clashing with the international and regional 
variables. There is also an absence of a common Arab course of action to prioritize the 
Arab issues and support open dialogue among the Arab states, which will support trust 
and cooperation between them and create a sense of a common national strategy to 
protect Arab interests.174 In addition, the Gulf states are not quite able to create security 
policies for the Gulf. If they do, the region can deal appropriately with any hostile 
security policies, if needed, for the purpose of having the highest measures of national 
security through determining the sources of threats and the means to confront them. 
Furthermore, the Gulf states have no joint military force policy in place, or military 
cooperation. This constraint may result in the emergence of a security vacuum that allows 
an external intervention in the Gulf region.175 Moreover, for some Arab countries, the 
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relationship with the United States has been affected negatively as a result of U.S. 
support to the Arab Uprising or the Arab Spring revolutions that have shaken the security 
and the stability of the Arab countries. The revolutions also provoked dangerous 
disturbances and divisions, which had an important impact on the closeness between the 
United States and Iran and the approval of the G5 members of the Security Council, in 
addition to Germany, for Iran to continue INP for peaceful purposes.176 Furthermore is the 
loss of Iraq’s political influence after its destruction, occupation, and exposure to 
attempts of division. This reduced the country’s role in promoting national security of the 
Gulf states and to their ability to confront the Iranian influence in the region, or to offer 
support and protection to neighboring Gulf states. Another serious political constraint is 
Iran’s policy of exporting violence and terrorism through the exploitation of the Shiite 
minorities residing in the Gulf states. Iran might use the Shiite minority groups to shake 
the security and stability of the region and make the Gulf states preoccupied with their 
internal affairs, therefore no longer requesting any action against the INP.177 
The researcher notes that the political constraints limit the success of the Gulf 
states’ efforts in facing the INP. On the contrary, it participates in the completion of the 
Iranian project, especially after the approval of the world power on the continuation of 
the project, which will increase the possibility of threats from Iran. Therefore, the Gulf 
states must positively cooperate and acquire a greater sense of solidarity to face the issue. 
2. Economic Constraints 
There are also economic constraints that limit the success of the Gulf states’ 
efforts to confront the INP directly. Basma Saeed argues that one of these constrains is 
the inability of the Gulf states to complete each other and form a joint economic power 
that could be the foundation for economic and social powers capable of achieving total 
economic supremacy. “Growing differences between GCC countries on a number of 
issues make it difficult to imagine that a union would succeed.”178 Having this unified 
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economic power might prevent Iran from assaulting the region. Economic power offers 
immunity, not unlike military power. A great example of economic power is Japan, 
which has economic international power, and no military force of any country can assault 
it.179  
Kishk points out the dependence of the Gulf economy on the Iranian economy 
and its association with it, as the terms of trade are doubling between the Gulf states and 
Iran.180 This has a direct impact on the conflicting situations of the Gulf states from those 
who are for or against Iran’s possession of nuclear capabilities. Moreover, most Gulf 
states are not using diversity regarding their economy and main source of income; they 
have only one source—oil—which will end one day or may be stopped as a result war. 
The author argues that the Gulf states are not able to create a suitable environment for 
diversifying the local industry and controlling it nationally.181 
Kishk aims to identify a lack of economic cooperation among the Gulf states 
because their economic policies are unable to achieve a balanced economic and social 
development. Also, there is hardly any commercial trading within the Gulf states, but 
there is an increase in commercial trading with Iran. In addition, there is a decline in the 
international Arab competitiveness due to the world’s major power policy against Arab 
products.182 
John Miglietta argues that the Gulf states are very concerned about the 
consequences and impacts of any military action against Iran.183 If military action would 
take place against Iran, the entire region, including the Gulf states, could possibly be 
destroyed and suffer catastrophy. Also, the region will suffer destruction of its economic 
capacities. For example, as retaliation, Iran might try to stop the export of Gulf oil to the 
United States and Western Europe by closing off the Gulf region and targeting passing 
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ships. This would result in lack of food, supplies, and medicine in the Gulf states, which 
might affect security, stability, and prices. In short, the region would suffer multiple 
crises from the rise of criminal activities. Moreover, if this war lasted for a long time, 
then the Gulf economy would collapse and the region might reverse to its developmental 
stages.184 
The researcher notes that these economic constraints limit the Gulf states from 
confronting the INP; on the contrary, these economic constraints might help Iran 
complete its project. This is due to the Gulf states’ fear of Iranian military power, the 
unpredicted Iranian leaders, and their abilities to incite war in the region. Eruption of a 
war will definitely negatively impact the Gulf states and destroy their oil-based economy. 
Iran is aware of that, and it is its winning card if it decides to prevent the Gulf’s oil 
exportation. Therefore, the best strategy to stop the INP, or to at least have guarantees 
that it will be used for peaceful purposes only, is that the Gulf states gradually lessen 
commercial trade with Iran and reach the point of blocking the commercial trade as an 
economic pressure strategy. 
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V. OUTCOME OF THE STUDY AND VIEWS ON 
CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROJECT 
When dealing with Iran, any collective Gulf strategy vision to oppose the INP will 
necessarily call on Gulf states to deploy soft influence of political and economic 
strategies by promoting closer ties with Iran. This starts a new chapter of political 
dialogue aimed at persuading Iran to realize the risks of its nuclear weapons program that 
will destabilize the security of the Gulf. Moreover, Gulf states may also deploy their soft 
leverage in other economic fields, focusing mainly on the idea that Iran’s possession of 
nuclear weapons will ultimately threaten the oil fields, which may halt oil exports to the 
United States and the European Union.185  Another aspect that should be considered 
comprehensively is enforced economic sanctions, which would either suspend the INP 
altogether or assure peaceful utilization of the program. Such aspects might push Iran to 
reconsider its nuclear program. 
 FAILURE TO STEP UP SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT ON IRAN A.
The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE) mentions that all states 
demand that Iran be prohibited from owning nuclear arms. The global mission of halting 
Iranian development in the field is focused around a strong and widespread range of 
endorsements that aim to confine Iran’s economy.186 The Gulf states offer feelings of 
respect towards the demands of the United Nations Security Council sanctions, but they 
have understandably hesitated to breach any legal obligations. By reducing the state’s 
accessible resources and centering its cost-benefit analysis on moderation, sanctions 
would play a vital role in regional policy with Tehran.187 Modern studies advise a rather 
Draconian stance in the Middle East, a hotspot for Iranian offshore financing and re-
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exports. Ultimately, more measures should be taken to communicate to Tehran that its 
possibilities of evading or mitigating sanctions will be scarce.188 
 FAILURE TO ADDRESS DOMESTIC COMPLAINTS WITHIN THE B.
GULF STATES  
Laurence Louer says Iran’s primary methods of asserting its dominance in the 
Gulf typically involved the intimidation of restless minority groups, especially Shi’a, to 
fund militants in neighboring countries, rather than the practice of direct military 
exercise.189 Essentially, Iran’s ability to assemble the disenfranchised people within Gulf 
states is the foremost hazard these countries are confronted with. Therefore, each of these 
states has devoted substantial amounts of time towards strengthening infrastructure 
security and further devices to dull future threats. The Gulf regimes’ new optimistic 
attitude toward their Shia citizens ought to denote equal attention to their prospective 
social and political susceptibilities. The question of integrating foreign employee dissects 
into the community atmosphere of the Gulf in a more sustainable manner should be 
treated as well.190 
 IMPROVEMENT OF REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION C.
According to Suzanne Maloney, the history of the GCC includes deliberate 
military developments as well as political reform meant to galvanize a common guard.191 
Though internal feuds on the series of national security dilemmas have limited the 
procedure to date, Gulf states have pushed for intensified teamwork among the states of 
the Arabian Peninsula. farther expand abilities for more arranged defense planning and 
reaction to the series of possibility passive active efforts, a nuclear Iran might assume the 
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situation in its right. It is, therefore, important to note that Gulf states have done little to 
think creatively about mitigating vulnerabilities.192 
 FAILURE TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF D.
PROLONGED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DETERRENCE  
Joseph Pilat and Nathan Busch address that to shield against the prospect of a 
nuclear Iran requires the pronunciation of a logical approach of deterrence.193 Gulf states 
have failed to design a comprehensive policy not only to prevent Iran’s nuclear program, 
also to deter any negative outcomes when Iranian nuclear accomplishment, such as the 
possibility of an Israeli attack or the invitation for Gulf states to start nuclear research.194 
 BLURRED DIPLOMACY WITH TEHRAN E.
Gulf state policy alternatives on Iran, as these states are most directly influenced 
by Iranian nuclear activity, must not be partial to ignoring the circumstances or to 
argument. To a certain extent, Gulf states should be induced to step up and promote 
thinking outside of the box to solve their security threats. It is worth noting that Gulf 
States, without doubt, adhere to an Iran free of nuclear power, but they are reluctant to 
presume the cost of negotiation with Iran. Though it is reasonable that the current Iranian 
policies, confrontational in nature, would make it politically unpleasant to negotiate with 
the state, a lack of direct dialog has worked to the obstruction of the Gulf states.195 
 IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR THE GULF STATES F.
Maloney argues that current discussion by most U.S leaders has requested to do a 
process with abstruseness in Iran regarding the ramifications of nuclear weapons 
acquisition.196 Such indications may be expounding the vicissitudes of its actions towards 
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Tehran. In addition, the unambiguous Israeli vows to use force to prevent Iran from 
crossing the nuclear threshold carry a regrettable side effect states like India and Pakistan 
that breached their nuclear threshold, or those prevented from acquiring such arms, like 
South Africa, are obligated to obfuscate their programs and evade affirmation or testing 
or risk terminating international partnerships and respect.197 
  Maloney points out that Iran’s determination to invest in its nuclear program to 
negotiate, despite the threat of devastating economic weight and the cautionary words, 
commands thoughtful acknowledgement of a threat more serious than Tehran’s mere 
expansion of nuclear hedging.198 The basics of a reply to such a scenario, for the Gulf 
states, should not change considerably from the way to handling an Iran that has 
collective breakthrough power, but has decided not to arm itself.199 Though the 
predicament following breakout for Iran’s neighbors and for the international arena is 
direr, it will require a similar, but more urgent display of demands to improve the existing 
agenda for putting off Iran. One central peculiarity between an implied Iranian nuclear 
ability and an Iranian nuclear armory includes issues of uncertainty; Achievement and 
use of nuclear weapons would decisively reduce Iran’s ideal policy of vagueness and 
equivocation.  
No matter what the confines of the intelligence services of the Middle East 
countries that believe Iran’s nuclear activities a primary warning, Iran cannot hope to 
clandestinely hold a nuclear arsenal.200 Maloney explains that this sort of transparency 
comes with certain benefits, as any clear sign of a nuclear arsenal, capable of being noted 
through tests, or declarations would overwhelmingly undermine Iran’s choose position of 
rejection and dishonesty and would aggravate violent and almost world international 
convictions. Iran might be incapable of playing to the lingering caginess of world powers. 
This change in height and political and trade relations would be overwhelmingly 






challenging for a state already staggering from loneliness and economic stress.201 
Therefore, the foremost calculated inference of confirmed Iranian weaponization for the 
Gulf states would be the noticeably amplified possibility of state-border military action. 
With this comes the equivalent need to prepare for direct engagement, eventuality 
planning and alleviation of possible counter-effects upon infrastructure and civilian 
dissect, and to measure diplomatic and security requirements necessary to deal with a 
post-strike Iran. As they are prone to immediate contact with Iran, the Gulf states would 
gain an advantage through collaborating to strategy for the next period of Iran’s volatile 
political progression.202  
Maloney argues that it is still possible to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear 
arms, and it is desirable for states to follow through in their efforts to prevent such an 
event. However, Iran’s determined quest of its nuclear desires over dozens of years 
despite international risks, along with past models that extrapolate that a ruler curved on 
passing the nuclear doorstep will succeed, demands that the states that would suffer the 
most philosophical nuclear damage from Iran plan for the worst-possible-outcomes.203 
The olden times of the Cold War demonstrates the limited produce of nuclear nastiness. 
Dynamic and entrepreneurial, Gulf states have to prosper even under ambiguous security 
surroundings.204 
 THE PRESENCE OF THE SHIITE CRESCENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: G.
A RADICAL DESTABILIZATION THREAT BY THE 
REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AGAINST GULF STATES  
Ozdin points out that, following the U.S. invasion in Iraq in 2003, Shiite 
expansionism from Iran appeared significantly in the Arabian Peninsula.205 King 
Abdullah of Jordon announced the dangers of the “Shiite crescent” in December 2004, 
which spreads from Damascus to Tehran to Baghdad.  
                                                 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid., 21. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ozdin, “From Shiite Crescent to Full Moon.” 
 60 
Noting that Iran’s nuclear deal may upset the equilibrium of power in the region 
and exacerbate sectarian’s tightness, The Economist proceeds to discuss Iran economy, 
political and military support to its proxies from Levant to southern Arabian peninsula.206 
Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador of the U.N. under President Bush argued that “Iran 
is stronger today because of the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.” The assault 
of Iraq has severely altered the Middle East in unpredictable manners. In fact, it helped 
Iran become the winner in the region, as Iraq was the only competitor to Iran from the 
Arab world (especially after the eight years’ war).207 Iran geographical fortune is 
characterized by the Persian Empire history that will complete luring the Iranian 
ambitions in its regional interests and its foreign policy. Therefore, nuclear dialogue 
between Iran and the U.S. has nourished Iranian expansion. Iran has worked in the 
growth of Syria for the past four years, using Hezbollah militia in Syria along with 
members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, captured or killed by the Syrian Free 
Army. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasr Allah said that “We were where we 
needed to be, and we will be where we must be; we believe that this is not just the battle 
of the Syrian people, it is defending ourselves: Syria, Lebanon and the entire region.” In 
conclusion, the collapse of the Saddam’s regime in Iraq let the formation of Shiite 
militias to appear and strengthen within the country, while facing a battle against ISIS. 
These militias, along with the Iraqi Army, are fighting under Iranian influence and 
coordination, specifically by Qassem Suleimani, chief of Iran’s elite al-Quds branch of 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Such threats towards Saudi Arabia must be eliminated 
in order to stabilize the region from any radical movements and activities.208 





 KING SALMAN’S PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING A UNIFIED ARAB H.
MILITARY FORCE 
Shibley Telhami argues that, despite other states’ projections, the Arab domain 
has never been characterized for its harmony.209 In fact, Arab leaders’ idea to establish a 
joint military force should be credited to Saudi Arabian foreign policy as a major 
achievement. However, all Arab leaders stressed such a decision as the President of 
Egypt encouraged it. Such allied force is a result of the continuous serious threats facing 
the Arab world. Recently, Saudi Arabia is indubitably responsible for much of the 
religious radicalism in the contemporary Arab world. The Saudis have combined their 
financial power to become the largest weapons importer in the world as of 2015. After 
decades of hoarding its modern arsenal, Saudi Arabia has used its power to return its 
kidnapped neighboring country, Yemen, in Operation Decisive Storm, that has the most 
international rightfulness and support by most of the world leading powers. Operation 
Decisive Storm consists of an alliance of at least ten countries in a fight against a Shiite 
rebellious militia, the Houthies, supported by Iran. In 2013, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
proposed in the GCC annual convention the expansion of GCC to add the Arab world’s 
remaining monarchies, Jordan and Morocco. This would create an undefeatable force 
against the possible insurgencies occurring in the region. Egypt, on the other hand, shall 
profit a great deal in such a process, where it has, guaranteed, billions of dollars in Saudi 
aid to rely on, and therefore an elevated military role in the Middle East stability.210 
Gedalyah Reback argues that, as Arab Spring uprisings appeared in 2011, the 
Saudi regime deemed itself invulnerable, even after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s 
immediate tumble from power.211 The Saudi leadership’s confidence was later 
questioned by a collection of frightened actions of some neighboring countries and strong 
allies. Factually, the most effective Arab steps arrived with a Saudi-Egyptian alliance in 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Although Egyptian and Syrian troops fought together, Saudis 
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and Algerians held a vital role in economics and politics, as oil was an essential weapon. 
Nowadays, the Saudis oppose instant action in Yemen. Though Saudi Arabia’s 
responsibility is courageous and novel, no one can underestimate the challenges ahead, 
especially if ground forces are eventually needed and attacks from Yemen on Saudi 
territory expand. This should bring Saudi Arabia to a point where it is finally capable 
militarily. Because Saudi Arabia is considered the world’s main importer of arms, several 
nations view the Saudi military as crucial to providing military stability to the area. The 
Saudi military role is not yet revealed, because Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to be without 
political or military fighting support. Meanwhile, after the fall of the Eastern gate of the 
Arab world, along with the neglected Iraqi Sunnis, Iraq has been an active ally of Iran’s. 
Yet Yemen has been facing the same strategy by Iran, which threatens Saudi’s borders, as 
it is considered the Southern gate of Saudi Arabia borders. Saudi concerns about Iran are 
not just limited to being a direct military one, or INP. In fact, the Saudis do not wish Iran 
to gain nuclear arms: Saudi Arabia’s major concern is Iran’s expansion of its radical 
falsified Islamic and political power in Arab regions. This rivalry is not limited to 
religious backgrounds, but it threateningly impairs sectarianism in that Saudis are 
concerned with the growth of Iranian-backed Shiite Arabs. On the other hand, after the 
fall of some countries during the Arab Spring, intensifying sectarianism has given 
Radical Islamists more recruits capabilities that target the Gulf monarchies as enemies 
within.212 
Reback says that the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), or so-called ISIS, 
served as a wake-up call for Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries because ISIS’s focus 
is on replacing the Arab regimes with ambiguous fates. Another serious case that is worth 
presenting in this research is the Syrian issue. Saudi Arabia is torn between despising 
ISIS and its contempt for President Bashar al-Assad. Alternatively, the Egyptian-Saudi 
military and political cooperation faces another threat: the negotiation between Iran and 
the international arena, which Arab rulers dread will enlarge Iran’s impact at their cost. 
However, the joint Arab force may face greater obstacles, such as insurgency or failed 
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states.213 As the joint Arab force moves towards its reformation, more political and 
economic means are required to be accomplished prior to the unification of the military 
powers. Hence, in conclusion, the joint Arab force’s main potential is not facing Iran, 
Israel, or Western powers. In fact, it is essentially aiming to halt the insurgencies within 
the Arab world.  
 SAUDI ARABIA’S STRATEGIC DECISION TO OWN NUCLEAR I.
WEAPONS  
Mohammed H. Amir mentions that Dr.Abdulla Al-Askar a member of the Saudi 
Arabian Foreign Affairs Committee of Shura council, points out that Saudi Arabia is one 
of the most influential countries in the Middle East.214 Owning a nuclear weapon is not 
far distant for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia but is part of a strategic perspective to 
dominate peace and harmony among the world throughout the Islamic behavior, as it is 
the land of Islam. In such regards, a member of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Affairs 
Committee of Shura Council, Dr. Abdulla Al-Askar, argues in his article that the Saudi 
Arabia government agreed to the terms of the nuclear deal between Iran and the West. 
Al-Askar mentions that, as long as Iran gains the right to launch its nuclear program, then 
it is possible for Egypt and Saudi Arabia having nuclear programs in the Middle East, 
depending on the political decisions. He also mentions that he is not concerned about 
Tehran having the nuclear program under agreed-upon conditions, but his concern is 
about the failure of Tehran to obligate to the conditions, since it is known to be a rogue, 
sectarian, and knowledgeable about the quirks.215  
Al-Askar points out that once Iran gains the right to operate its nuclear program 
and the international sanctions are dropped, it is expected to fund the Shiite terrorist 
groups, causing unrest in the region, as noticed in the past four years in the Arabian Gulf 
region. On the other hand, the United States has assured the Gulf states that the 
agreement will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon, while the Arab states are calling 
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upon stripping Israel of its nuclear weapon and increasing its scientific capacity to oppose 
the Iranian nuclear power. Saudi Arabia has the scientific, material, educational, and 
financial capacity required to develop a nuclear program, as Russia signed agreements on 
such purposes. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has been developing its nuclear program 
infrastructure for the past twenty years by sending missions to Europe and nuclear energy 
countries in all branches.216 
Finally, Al-Askar concludes that once the agreement has been signed, Iran has 
sixty days to announce its final position of the agreement, which is committing to the 
international decision of not developing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Arab states are 
prepared for the INP developments, as they are ready to launch their nuclear programs 
once political decisions are considered.217 
Yaroslav Trofimov argues that President Obama sees a strategic target behind the 
agreement, as the Saudis are making strategic decisions to possess nuclear weapons in the 
near future in order to equalize threats in the region.218 Saudi Arabia has decided to 
purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan to match up with the Middle Eastern nuclear 
race. In fact, this would prompt Egypt and Turkey to step into the nuclear race.219 In 
addition, the newspaper adds that former Saudi Arabia’s foreign affairs minister said that 
“anything Iran has would be available for us too.” The United States has reinforced its 
eligibility to protect the GCC as close allies of Washington. On the other hand, French 
President François Hollande stresses that Iran must comply with the agreement and shall 
never possess the nuclear weapon in the final agreement. He adds that the initial weapons 
equilibrium agreement does not grant Iran the right to possess nuclear weapons, because 
the financial sanctions have been partially raised, and that such agreement shall not 
disturb the region’s stability.220  
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Trofimov stresses that his country will always remain loyal to its allies and 
protects their interests with power, if needed. Meanwhile, a great debate has been argued 
that Saudi Arabia has acquired Chinese nuclear weapons, has financed a nuclear weapons 
program in Pakistan, and has begun building a nuclear program. Prince Turki al-Faisal 
said, “If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will possess nuclear weapons.” In 
2003, several sources confirmed that Saudi Arabia has three options towards the nuclear 
weapons: first, to ally itself with a country that has nuclear weapons; second, to get rid of 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East, including in Israel and Iran; and third, to own a 
Saudi nuclear program.221 In fact, Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country to have a 
military force, known as the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force, which aims to defeat 
any nuclear threat, as the kingdom is against possessing nuclear weapons in the Middle 
East and signed a treaty on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and supporting a 
nuclear-free zone.222 In 2008, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the United States 
to build a civilian nuclear program in Saudi Arabia to serve peaceful matters. This 
program was supported by Pakistan, as the relationship between Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan is considered strong. This program was initiated earlier to oppose the Israeli 
nuclear program, as the Indian nuclear program has been considered a threat to the 
Islamic world.223  
The Pakistani nuclear program was initially funded by Saudi Arabia in 1974. The 
Prime Minister of Pakistan declared in a visit to Saudi Arabia in 1980, “Our achievement 
is yours,” referring to the nuclear weapons program. Then, in 1998, Nawaz Sharif 
thanked Saudi Arabia for supporting his country after the successful nuclear tests. This 
triggered Western communities to suspect that Pakistan would sell nuclear heads and 
nuclear technologies to Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia denied such allegations.224 
In 1990, Saudi Arabia purchased 60 ballistic missiles from China capable of 
carrying nuclear warheads. In 2102, an agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia and 






China on mutual cooperation in the nuclear energy field to support the peaceful nuclear 
programs between the countries. In 2015, Saudi Arabia finally signed an agreement with 
South Korea to build two nuclear reactors for $2 billion over twenty years, including 
research and development, training, and construction. This agreement has been discussed 
for the past four years in order to grant Saudi Arabia a nuclear infrastructure for its newly 
built research reactors. In addition, by 2030, Saudi Arabia will possess sixteen nuclear 
reactors capable of producing nuclear weapons if circumstances force it to do so, being 
surrounded by Israel and Iranian nuclear powers. In this regards, Pakistan has stressed 
that the security of Saudi Arabia is mutual to Pakistan, as they are considered one 
country, and any threat to Saudi Arabia is a threat to Pakistan.225  
Trofimov mentions that Saudi is capable of possessing nuclear warheads from 
Pakistan at any time. In addition, Gary Samore, President Barak Obama’s advisor said, 
“thinks that Saudi Arabia has an understanding with Pakistan that Pakistan, in extreme 
cases, will give the Saudi nuclear weapons.”226 On March 30, 2015, former Saudi 
ambassador in Washington, Adel al-Jubeir said that the United States announced that 
Saudi Arabia will build its own nuclear program and would build a nuclear bomb to 
counter the Iranian military nuclear program, stressing that it does not negotiate on the 
doctrine of the kingdom and its security, following the decline of uranium transferred to 
Russia within 24 hours of the deadline for the end of the agreement.227 Moreover, it is 
important to mention that Saudi Arabia possesses two types of middle-range missiles 
capable of carrying nuclear warheads and high explosives, produced in 1971 and used 
only in China and Saudi Arabia. These missiles are called Eastern Winds coded by DF-3. 
These missiles, including Shaheen missiles, range up to 900 kilometers and were 
developed in Pakistan. They are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.228 
Finally, in regards to the Saudi Arabian missile platforms, satellite images taken 
in July 2013 found signs indicating that one is pointing to the northwest towards Tel 






Aviv, and the second platform to the northeast toward Tehran. Al-Saleel base is 
considered the first ballistic missile facility in Saudi Arabia, built in 1987, 450 km north 
of Riyadh. Other missile bases are to be mentioned, such as base 511, about 70–90 km 
south of Riyadh; base 533; base 566, about 750 km from the northwest of Riyadh; base 
544; and base 522 in the valley of Dowasser.229 
 HISTORIC DEAL REACHED OVER IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM J.
The United States and other world powers reached a historic agreement with Iran here 
Tuesday, aimed at preventing the Islamic republic from building a nuclear weapon in 
return for the lifting of sanctions that have isolated the country and hobbled its economy. 
−Carol Morello and Karen DeYoung230 
Morello and DeYoung argue that the INP agreement has played a massive role in 
the West as the Middle East faces aftershocks from the Arab Spring. After several years 
of arguments over the program, Iran finally succeeded in raising economic sanctions, 
along with gaining the conditional agreement of possessing the nuclear program.231 After 
the announcement of the agreement in Vienna on Tuesday, July 13, 2015, President 
Obama saw this deal as an achievement for American diplomacy that may change the 
world. In fact, he said that this conditional agreement will ensure that Iran shall have no 
possibility of achieving a nuclear weapons program for at least the next decade. “Every 
pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off,” Obama said.232 
The conditional agreement includes the limitation of Iran’s nuclear capability and 
imposing strict international monitoring in exchange for lifting international economic 
sanctions. Such conditions, according to senior administration officials, would make the 
world more secure. On the other hand, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John 
A. Boehner, disagreed with the decision, saying, “If, in fact, it’s as bad a deal as I think it 
is at this moment, we’ll do everything that we can to stop it.” President Obama ignored 
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such claims and carried on with his decision. In addition, the agreement will not be 
effective until Iran is certified by the IAEA as having met its requirements.233 
Several analysts among from the U.S. allies have been concerned about the 
agreement, though President Obama assured them that the agreement of the Iranian 
nuclear program shall not be harmful for the region. The Arabian Gulf, however, believes 
that lifting sanctions would increase Iran’s efforts to expand its powers creating terroristic 
chaos. On the other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had another 
perspective, that Iran would not only get a nuclear weapon out of the agreement, but also 
continue support terrorism once sanctions are gone. Moreover, senior U.S. administration 
officials affirmed that, until Iranian compliance is verified, an interim agreement 
restricting Iran’s nuclear activities and sanctions will remain in place.234 Iranian President 
Hassan Rouhani predicted that Iran’s relations with the world would change only if the 
agreement was implemented in a rightful procedure. There was no immediate public 
comment from Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as Iranian officials have 
long claimed that the capability to possess a nuclear program would benefit Iran with 
energy and medical applications.235 
 THE STANDPOINT OF THE GULF STATES TOWARD THE K.
IRANIANAN NUCLEAR PROJECT AGREEMENT 
Ahmad Taleb argues that the INP agreement carries tough considerations and 
concerns for members of the GCC, as “the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council and Germany reached a nuclear deal,” which promises 
enhanced relationships between the West and Iran that may hide more unsteadiness of the 
Middle East region in the future.236 The Israeli prime minister described the agreement as 
a historic mistake.237 Nowadays, Saudi Arabia and members of GCC seem to adopt rigid 
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situations “regarding different issues in the Middle East and towards Iranian policy.”238 
This can be obtained from the official statements about Iranian involvement in Syria, 
Yemen, and Iraq.239 
Gulf states nowadays are preparing for the upcoming storm of the Iranian 
economy that may lessen the tension in the Middle East. In other words, the Arab 
countries seem pessimistic regarding the Iranian nuclear agreement as the West finds it 
optimistic to “open a new page with Iran and elaborate fresh regional policies that are 
based on cooperation and compromise rather than clash and tension.”240 
 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY L.
The Gulf states need to understand that Iran is highly capable of producing its 
own nuclear weapons. Additionally, Iran seeks to make nuclear weapons deterrents 
against neighboring Gulf states and Israel in order to safeguard its security and achieve its 
expansionist policy. Iran desires to secure itself from nearby and external threats. In a 
regional arms race, such as the one among the Gulf states, all Arab countries may choose 
to seek out nuclear weapons to protect themselves. Thus, all the above facts make Iran a 
potential producer of nuclear weapons. However, it is important to note that in its efforts 
to produce them, Iran still faces substantial challenges, which will be expounded later in 
this chapter.  
1. Possible Problems for Gulf States 
Gulf states face the potential threat of violence exported from Iran reminiscent of the 
Arab Spring in 2011 and violent extremists like ISIS, the Houthies, as the al-Nusra Front 
and Hezbollah have risen. There is always the possibility that the United States will 
intervene to help the Gulf region to eliminate these groups. Any Iranian retaliation 
against U.S. attacks would lead to a regional war, undermining and threatening the 
security and stability of the entire region. War would create the possibility of an 





overthrowing of the Arab Gulf governments or an expansion of the Iranian-Shiite 
theocratic model, which undermines the Arab identity. Iran crossing of the nuclear 
doorstep will impact the balance of power in an explosive and important region. In 
addition to political power, the Arab Gulf nations could face diminished economic 
positions and possibly radiation pollution. 
2. Obstacles Hindering Gulf States from Confronting the Iranian 
Nuclear Project 
There is a lack of political dialogue among Gulf states in persuading Iran to 
suspend its nuclear program. The Gulf states lack a clear, well-defined strategy or 
common procedure to secure the Arab Gulf region. The Gulf states are hesitant to 
gradually step up sanctions and are unable to achieve a variation of their income 
resources and maintain them to set up supplementary industries. Some of the Gulf states 
support Iran’s right to acquire nuclear weapons, while others hesitate to support the 
strategy of both the United States and EU in denying Iran nuclear capabilities. The 
international arena has failed to declare the Gulf a region free of weapons of mass 
destruction. The Gulf states also have an inability to adopt a clear political posture to 
form strong economic relations with Iran. The fact that the Gulf states are trying to 
prevent any military confrontation with Iran is also hindering the general progress. 
Additionally, the Gulf states have failed to draw an Arab Gulf security policy that can 
deal with opposing security policies.  
3. The Strategic Vision and the Corresponding Means to Confront the 
Iranian Nuclear Project 
Gulf states like Saudi Arabia could try to achieve national security through the 
use or production of their own nuclear weapons to maintain a strategic balance with Iran. 
The Gulf states could implement international guarantees that restrict Iran to using its 
nuclear program solely for peaceful purposes. A well-balanced political dialogue between 
the Gulf states and Iran will help suspend Iran’s nuclear weapons program. A true 
commitment by Iran to accept regular effective inspection of its nuclear installations will 
also help defend against the risks of the INP. The international community should urge 
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Iran to continue cooperating after the Vienna Declaration to prevent the manufacturing of 
nuclear weapons and to keep Iran’s nuclear power peaceful. Efforts in various 
international arenas to free the Gulf region from any weapons of mass destruction could 
also help. The significant economic and political position of the Gulf states in general and 
Saudi Arabia in particular help the Gulf region maintain safety and security to face 
nuclear arms without any direct confrontation with Iran. The GCC should support the 
policies of both the United States and the EU to deny INP capabilities, which will 
certainly help minimize the risks. 
4. Strategic Recommendations 
In light of the outcome reached by this study, the researcher presents 
recommendations for the GCC. The first recommendation is the formation of a single, 
integrated GCC nuclear agency, charged with the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes in the Gulf region. The researcher calls for an international conference to free 
the Gulf in particular and the Middle East in general from weapons of mass destruction, 
emphasizing that countries that possess nuclear installations or those in the process of 
developing such installations comply with the terms of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), including the periodic inspection of nuclear facilities. Capitalizing on 
the political and the economic power of the Gulf states will press Iran to review its 
nuclear program, or even restrict its use to peaceful purposes. To initiate the process, 
there must be direct dialogue between the GCC and Iran with the aim of explaining the 
risks of producing nuclear weapons, the risks of being attacked, and the risks of radiation 
polluting the whole Gulf region. The GCC must take the necessary measures to form an 
integrated single body able to confront the INP. The researcher recommends that the 
GCC elicit international public opinion in an effort to suspend the INP. Gulf states in 
conjunction with the international community must seek regional and international 
assurances that Iran shall not use its program for producing nuclear weapons. 
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